Assessing the Competing Characteristics of Privacy and Safety within Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks by Connors, Jacob W.
Air Force Institute of Technology
AFIT Scholar
Theses and Dissertations Student Graduate Works
3-23-2018
Assessing the Competing Characteristics of Privacy
and Safety within Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks
Jacob W. Connors
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/etd
Part of the Digital Communications and Networking Commons, and the Navigation, Guidance,
Control, and Dynamics Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more information, please contact richard.mansfield@afit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Connors, Jacob W., "Assessing the Competing Characteristics of Privacy and Safety within Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks" (2018). Theses
and Dissertations. 1801.
https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/1801
ASSESSING THE COMPETING
CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVACY AND
SAFETY WITHIN VEHICULAR AD HOC
NETWORKS
THESIS
Jacob W. Connors
AFIT-ENG-MS-18-M-019
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR UNIVERSITY
AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
The views expressed in this document are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the United States Air Force, the United States Department
of Defense or the United States Government. This material is declared a work of the
U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States.
AFIT-ENG-MS-18-M-019
ASSESSING THE COMPETING CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVACY AND
SAFETY WITHIN VEHICULAR AD HOC NETWORKS
THESIS
Presented to the Faculty
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Graduate School of Engineering and Management
Air Force Institute of Technology
Air University
Air Education and Training Command
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Master of Science in Cyber Operations
Jacob W. Connors, B.S.
March 2018
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
AFIT-ENG-MS-18-M-019
ASSESSING THE COMPETING CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVACY AND
SAFETY WITHIN VEHICULAR AD HOC NETWORKS
Jacob W. Connors, B.S.
Committee Membership:
Dr. Scott R. Graham
Chair
Dr. Scott L. Nykl
Member
Lt Col Logan O. Mailloux, PhD
Member
AFIT-ENG-MS-18-M-019
Abstract
The introduction of Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication has the promise of
decreasing vehicle collisions, congestion, and emissions. However, this technology
places safety and privacy at odds; an increase of safety applications will likely result
in the decrease of consumer privacy. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administra-
tion (NHTSA) has proposed the Security Credential Management System (SCMS) as
the back end infrastructure for maintaining, distributing, and revoking vehicle certifi-
cates attached to every Basic Safety Message (BSM). This Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) scheme is designed around the philosophy of maintaining user privacy through
the separation of functions to prevent any one subcomponent from identifying users.
However, because of the high precision of the data elements within each message this
design cannot prevent large scale third-party BSM collection and pseudonym linking
resulting in privacy loss. In addition, this philosophy creates an extraordinarily com-
plex and heavily distributed system. In response to this difficulty, this thesis proposes
a data ambiguity method to bridge privacy and safety within the context of intercon-
nected vehicles. The objective in doing so is to preserve both Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V)
safety applications and consumer privacy. A Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network (VANET)
metric classification is introduced that explores five fundamental pillars of VANETs.
These pillars (Safety, Privacy, Cost, Efficiency, Stability) are applied to four different
systems: Non-V2V environment, the aforementioned SCMS, the group-pseudonym
based Vehicle Based Security System (VBSS), and VBSS with Dithering (VBSS-D)
which includes the data ambiguity method of dithering. By using these evaluation
criteria, the advantages and disadvantages of bringing each system to fruition is show-
cased.
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ASSESSING THE COMPETING CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVACY AND
SAFETY WITHIN VEHICULAR AD HOC NETWORKS
I. Introduction
Over the course of the past century, innovations in technology have increased vehi-
cle safety. Innovations such as seat belts, airbags, and vehicle design architecture have
all improved occupant safety in the event of a vehicle-on-vehicle collision. However,
there is a physical limitation to these mechanisms. These safety devices are reactive;
designed to protect a vehicle’s occupants after a collision has occurred. What if a
driver could be alerted before a collision in order to prevent it from occurring?
Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication has set out to create a safety proactive
vehicular environment. By broadcasting information such as speed, heading, location,
and other safety-critical information vehicles would be capable of alerting drivers of
hazardous scenarios. However, with the disclosure of information, consumer privacy
is at risk and needs to be addressed before V2V communication can deployed within
production vehicles.
1.1 Background and Motivation
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the U.S. govern-
ment agency responsible for addressing safety concerns have been at the forefront of
V2V communication. In early 2017, NHTSA published a Notice of Proposed Rule-
making (NPR) that presents an overview of the V2V technology, logistical impacts,
and the schedule of the proposed implementation timeline [1]. Much of the work
within this thesis is based of information within the 2017 NHTSA NPR.
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The environment that V2V communication creates is referred to as a Vehicu-
lar Ad-Hoc Networks (VANETs). The different types of devices that constitute a
VANET are On-Board Units (OBUs) and Road Side Units (RSUs). V2V is the com-
munication of two OBUs while the communication of vehicles and RSUs is referred to
as vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communication. Vehicle-to-Anything (V2X) repre-
sents communication between a vehicle and anything else that is not an OBU or RSU.
The purpose of RSUs is to issue security credentials, relay traffic environment condi-
tions, and communicate to higher level certificate authorities. OBUs transmit Basic
Safety Messages (BSMs) at a frequency of 10 Hz with typical transmission range of
three hundred meters. The data within these messages allows for applications such as
forward collision warning, blind spot warning, and electronic emergency brake lights
and similar applications [1].
NHTSA is invested in protecting the privacy of the consumer. The current leading
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) scheme, the Security Credential Management System
(SCMS), is modeled around a “privacy by design” approach [1]. This design calls
for a complex PKI that protects consumer privacy from insider threats within the
SCMS, however, it does little to hinder outsider threats. NHTSA states V2V messages
shall not include “data directly identifying a specific private vehicle or individual
regularly associated with it, or data reasonably linkable, as a practical matter, to an
individual.” By issuing this decree, information such as vehicle identification number,
license plate number, and other unique data is prohibited from being transmitted.
However, other information such as location, speed, and temporary identification
numbers are allowed. BSM linking – connecting one or more BSMs to an individual
vehicle – will be possible through the use of these BSM contents and data from other
sources.
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1.2 Problem Statement
The introduction of smart devices, such as V2V, has the promise of increasing con-
venience, safety, and overall quality of life. However, with the increase of technology,
this can lead to malicious actors and unwanted disclosure of information. Nonetheless,
V2V safety capabilities rely on the willful disclosure of information from the majority
of vehicles on the road. This creates a predicament for drivers who want to maintain
privacy (i.e., not broadcast location information), but still obtain the added safety
benefits of V2V. The trade-off between safety and privacy in a V2V environment can
be summarized by the following: safety is heightened through the disclosure of infor-
mation and privacy is heightened through the retention of information. This thesis
explores the current V2V privacy loss mitigation schemes and strikes a meaningful
balance between the contrasting natures of safety and privacy in a V2V environment
by introducing data ambiguity techniques to increase the sophistication required to
track vehicles.
1.3 Research Objectives
In order to properly understand, develop, and analyze V2V privacy, the following
objectives are specified:
• Understand the workings of Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE):
the protocol that makes V2V possible. This includes understanding what in-
formation is sent with each message and how a vehicle utilizes it.
• Understand the proposed certificate management systems that allow each vehi-
cle to sign and verify.
• Understand privacy from a legal standpoint in order to properly evaluate privacy
within a V2V environment.
3
• Obtain NHTSAs perspective on V2V to better understand the current state of
V2V research and legislation.
• Develop a data ambiguity solution to balance privacy and safety proof of con-
cept.
• Evaluate the solution versus current schemes and report effectiveness.
• Introduce policies to thwart point of origin and destination information disclo-
sure.
• Analyze the realistic expectation of privacy within the Information Age.
The fulfillment of these objectives allows for V2V communication safety applica-
tions and permits only safety-critical information to be collected by third-parties. In
doing so, this improves consumer privacy by increasing the level of technical ability
required to link V2V messages to a specific vehicle .
1.4 Approach
The approach this thesis takes is a mostly qualitative perspective. The use of
statistical analysis is not yet applicable as this work focuses on the projected dis-
closure of information and its effects. The constraints surrounding time, resources,
and safety has driven the methodology decisions concerning V2V message broadcast
simulation. The analysis of the effects on consumer privacy and safety rely on a
deep understanding of the technology because V2V has not been widely adopted nor
mandated as of the writing of this document. In addition to a qualitative analysis,
a quantitative analysis is also presented through the use of the Common Vulnerabil-
ity Scoring System (CVSS) for assigning scores to systems in relation to disclosing
consumer information.
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1.5 Organization
This document is broken into five chapters and the remaining four chapters are
described below:
Chapter II introduces the WAVE protocol and its components and operation pa-
rameters. Information exchanged with each V2V message is presented and discussed.
Applications that use this information is presented to highlight the safety benefits
possible through V2V communication. A privacy law taxonomy and its relevancy to
V2V is presented in order portray a comprehensive definition of privacy and intro-
duce topics utilized in analysis. Lastly, research conducted by NHTSA is presented
to portray current perspectives of V2V communication.
Chapter III introduces the research methodology of BSM linking. The three PKI
schemes under analysis are presented along with how BSM transmission is emulated
in a simulation environment. The data ambiguity method of dithering is presented
and defined.
Chapter IV introduces the analysis of the topics presented. Implications of each
scheme are discussed along with the safety impacts of dithering. The BSM linking
algorithms for each scheme are presented through the use of flowcharts. A VANET
Metric Classification is presented and discussed in accordance with each PKI scheme
discussed along with a non-VANET analysis to provide a viewpoint of current tech-
nology. Lastly, policies are presented to reduce individual privacy loss.
Chapter V concludes the document by summarizing the discussions, the findings
presented, areas of future work, and contributions. The difficulties discovered within
this topic are discussed. Opinions of the author are presented regarding the future of
V2V communication will become as the technology develops.
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II. Background and Related Research
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a technical summary of the Wireless Ac-
cess in Vehicular Environments (WAVE) protocol which is the underlying technology
of Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communications [2]. In addition, this chapter discusses
current research within V2V privacy and each individual WAVE component necessary
for operation is discussed. Each element of the Basic Safety Message (BSM) is high-
lighted to showcase the information being transmitted between V2V devices. Next,
V2V safety applications are presented to show the functionalities that are made pos-
sible by V2V. The two candidate Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) systems, Security
Credential Management System (SCMS) and Vehicle Based Security System (VBSS),
are presented for back end security management. Research conducted by the Na-
tional Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is presented which discusses
past BSM linking research, misbehavior detection techniques, and NHTSA’s V2V
Privacy Impact Assessment [1],[3]. In addition, three privacy preservation methods
are discussed. Finally, this chapter concludes with a taxonomy on privacy law. This
showcases the impact V2V could have on consumer rights if V2V becomes mandated.
2.1 WAVE Overview
In 1999, the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) allocated 75 MHz for
V2V communication within the 5.850 - 5.925 GHz band [4]. The FCC’s motivation
was to facilitate implementations of Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSs) to
decrease roadway congestion, increase passenger safety, and reduce the use of fossil
fuels. Using the guidelines set by the FCC the IEEE 1609 Working Group created
the IEEE 1609 Family of Standards for WAVE, with the intent to allow vehicles to
communicate wirelessly and securely[2]. These items together create what is referred
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to as a Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network (VANET).
2.1.1 Operation.
The WAVE standard operates on two types of hardware:
1. On-Board Units (OBUs) are the WAVE boxes installed within each vehicle.
2. Road Side Units (RSUs) are any stationary object that has a WAVE-capable
device installed.
As a vehicle travels, the OBU receives and transmits information from RSUs along
its route. This information could include anything from roadway delays to certificate
renewals from a Certificate Authority (CA). OBUs can also connect to other OBUs to
share safety messages and other critical data. RSUs could be traffic lights, light poles,
and other road side objects and infrastructure. They are typically stationary, but it
is possible for a RSU to be transportable when the case calls for it (e.g. construction,
law enforcement discretion, and accidents) [5].
Figure 1 depicts the WAVE protocol stack. The following sections will discuss
each individual standard and its role within a VANET.
Figure 1. WAVE protocol stack diagram.
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2.2 IEEE 802.11p
IEEE 802.11p covers the physical (PHY) and Medium Access Control (MAC) lay-
ers of the WAVE protocol. This standard incorporates aspects from the IEEE 802.11a
standard. This is done to prevent rewriting a ubiquitous wireless PHY layer design.
However, there are three modifications that cater to the mobile WAVE environment.
The first change IEEE 802.11p incorporates is the configuration to operate within
10 MHz wide channels whereas a typical 802.11a channel is 20 MHz. This allows
for longer guard intervals (discussed in 2.4) which helps prevent interference. IEEE
802.11p introduces improved receiver requirements to reduce cross channel interfer-
ence present in 802.11 devices as well as improved transmission masks [6].
The MAC layer utilizes Enhanced Distributed Channel Access (EDCA) which re-
lies on Carrier Sense Multiple Access / Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) to transmit
packets across the network. In CSMA/CA, a node will observe the network and will
transmit only if the network is open for a certain length of time - called the Arbitra-
tion Inter-Frame Space (AIFS). Otherwise, the node backs off for a random amount
of time before attempting to transmit again. CSMA/CA is optimal for a WAVE
environment because altering the AIFS allows for packet priority when transmitting.
High priority (such as safety messages) packets will have the shortest AIFS while
lower priority packets (non-safety messages) will have longer AIFS times [7].
2.3 IEEE 1609.4 - Multi-Channel Operation
The IEEE 1609.4 protocol operates on top of IEEE 802.11p. The purpose of this
standard is to create a seamless data transfer through multiple channels from the
lower physical layer to upper layers of the WAVE protocol. There are seven 10MHz
channels: one Control Channel (CCH) and six Service Channels (SCHs) of which two
are reserved (see Figure 2). The CCH broadcasts critical safety messages as well as
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available service announcements while the SCHs are utilized by those services. The
key difference between the CCH and SCHs is that the CCH only permits data frames
containing WAVE Short Message Protocol (WSMP) messages; whereas the SCHs
permit both WSMP messages and IPv6 messages [8].
Figure 2. Seven channels dedicated for WAVE use.
A device can gain access to the CCH or SCHs in one of three ways:
1. Continuous access: The channel (either CCH or SCH) is available for an unre-
stricted amount of time.
2. Immediate access: A device switches to a new channel immediately for an un-
restricted amount of time.
3. Alternating access: A device switches between CCH and SCH for a specified
time interval.
Alternating access is the common access method utilized amongst WAVE devices.
Access is granted for specific time intervals. The different time intervals are listed
below:
1. Time interval: specified to be one 50 ms channel allocation (CCH or SCH).
2. Sync Interval: Two adjacent time intervals utilized for synchronization (100
ms).
3. Guard interval: At the beginning of each time interval; are used to account for
radio effects and inaccuracies when switching channels (4 - 6 ms).
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Figure 3. Alternating access diagram showcasing each time interval.
A guard interval is split into three sections. The first and third section are determined
by half the synchronization tolerance. The second is determined by the maximum
channel switching time allowed. Data transmissions are prohibited during a guard
interval because a device could still be in-between channels. Thus, at the beginning
of a guard interval all transmissions on the current channel are suspended and trans-
missions on the new channel begin once the guard interval ceases. When a device
switches during the guard interval, it declares the medium busy to prevent simultane-
ous transmissions [8]. A 100 ms Sync interval maps directly to the 10 MHz frequency
rate specified in IEEE 802.11p [9].
2.4 IEEE 1609.3 - Network Services
IEEE 1609.3 provides the functionality to process data across the WAVE protocol
stack and consists of network and transport services. At the very minimum, a WAVE
device must have incorporated the following features:
1. Logical Link Layer (LLC) sublayer: Identifies higher layer protocol to be uti-
lized.
2. WAVE Short Message Protocol (WSMP): Protocol unique to WAVE that de-
liver WAVE Service Advertisements (WSAs) and WAVE Short Message (WSM)
to higher layers.
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3. Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6): Support for protocols such as UDP and/or
TCP.
4. The ability to transmit and/or receive.
Note: WAVE devices can support WSMP, IPv6, or both.
The LLC header contains a 2-octet EtherType field that designates what particular
protocol is to be used. When the LLC receives a transmission request from IPv6 or
WSMP, it sets the value EtherType accordingly and passes the data down the stack.
Likewise, when the LLC receives a packet from the MAC layer it parses the EtherType
field and passes the packet to the respective protocol [8].
The WSMP sends either WSAs (Figure 4), which announce availability of appli-
cation services WSMs (Figure 5) that are generic data packets. A WSA can be sent
secure or unsecured - in the latter case the 1609.2 Std specific fields are omitted.
The WSM is composed of the LLC header, network header, transport header, and
data. The network header indicates what networking subtypes are supported and the
WSMP version. The transport header specifies the transport protocol by designating
the address type to be used during transmission. Since the 1609.3 standard utilizes
data structures specified in 1609.2 Security protocol, any malicious activity occurring
within the security layer protocol could manifest within the network layers.
Figure 4. WAVE Service Advertisement Diagram.
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Figure 5. WAVE Short Message Diagram.
2.5 IEEE 1609.2 Security Services for Applications and Management
Messages
IEEE 1609.2 Security Services provides the cryptographic operations that allow
for secure communication between WAVE devices. It can be broken in two distinct
halves:
1. Internal Layer Security Services
• Security Data Services (SDSs)
• Security Service Management Entity (SSME)
2. Higher Layer Security Services
• Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Verification Entity
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• Peer-to-Peer Certificate Distribution (P2PCD) Entity
The Internal Layer is comprised of SDSs and a security management entity. SDSs
are fundamental in securing data transmission in WAVE. SDSs are invoked by Secure
Data Exchange Entitys (SDEEs) when information is transmitted or received. When
transmitting, the SDS converts data - called a protocol data unit (PDU) - into a
secured protocol data unit (SPDU). A SPDU can be one of three types: unsecured,
signed, or encrypted. When receiving, the process is reversed as the SDS receives a
SPDU and converts it to a PDU. A SDS may be invoked several times because a
SPDU may have multiple levels of encryption or decryption. Figure 6 depicts this
exchange below. The second portion of the Internal Layer contains the SSME. The
SSME retains all certificates and information pertaining to said certificates. When
information is added to the SSME it is made available to all SDEEs who have access
to the SSME.
Figure 6. WAVE Service Advertisement Diagram.
The Higher Layer of the IEEE 1609.2 standard is comprised of two entities. The
first, the CRL Verification Entity, validates CRLs as they are received. Once re-
ceived, the CRL is sent to a SDS for verification. If verified, any relevant revocation
information is passed to the SSME for storage. The P2PCD Entity is the primary
component behind P2PCD functionality. P2PCD is triggered when a device receives
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a signed SPDU and the issuer of the certificate is not recognized. The P2PCD entity
will send P2PCD learning requests to peer devices in attempt gain insight on the
unknown certificate [10].
2.5.1 Cryptographic Operations and Data Structures.
The data structure specified by IEEE 1609.2 for SPDUs is composed of three
central types: unsecured data, signed data, and encrypted data which align with the
three types of SPDUs. The SDS produces symmetrically encrypted data in one of
two approaches: ephemerally or statically. The difference between the approaches is
the first generates a new, random symmetric key while the second uses an established
symmetric key for encryption. Asymmetric encryption is used to encrypt symmetric
keys. Hashing is used in conjunction with the other cryptographic operations to
confirm uniqueness of information. Certificates and signing is discussed in the next
section. The cryptographic functions that are supported by IEEE 1609.2 are [10]:
1. Asymmetric Encryption: Elliptic Curve Integrate Encryption Scheme (ECIES)
2. Symmetric Encryption: Advanced Encryption Standard in Counter Mode with
Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code (AES-CCM)
3. Hashing: SHA-256
4. Signing: Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
Note: IEEE 1609.2 Security Services supports only the cryptographic algorithms
listed above.
2.5.2 Certificates and Signing.
A certificate is used to transport cryptographic information between WAVE de-
vices. This information includes: public keys, permissions, issuer identity, and re-
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vocation data. The two notable types of certificates are explicit and implicit. An
explicit certificate contains a public key whereas the implicit certificate contains a
value used to derive the public key. A certificate chain is a group of certificates or-
dered in a linear fashion. As a certificate is added to the chain the issuing certificate
is the adjacent certificate in the chain. The top of the chain is required to be an
explicit certificate and is referred to as the trust anchor. When data is hashed for
signing the data is given one of two verification values; certificate meaning the data
will be verified with a certificate and self-signed meaning there is an identifier key
within the data itself [10].
2.6 The Basic Safety Message
The BSM is the message format that is used by Vehicle-to-Anything (V2X) appli-
cations to transfer information to surrounding nodes. As the name suggests, safety
is the primary function for the BSM. These messages are transferred at a rate of ten
times each second. The BSM format is separated into two primary sections. The first
is transmitted with every message and the second part is sent only when necessary
such as emergency vehicle identity and safety event flags. Thus, the data contained
in the second type of data is optional and not necessary for successful transmissions.
The BSM is defined by the SAE J2735 data dictionary and SAE J2945 require-
ments documents [11], [12], [13]. The breakdown of the message contents by type is
shown below:
• BSM Data Contents Part 1
This information is mandatory and sent with every BSM transmission.
– Message Count: Provides a sequence number for messages that are sent
from the same sender. Sequence numbers are limited from 0 to 127.
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Senders can initialize this field to any value as senders may change their
temporary ID’s during a batch of messages.
– Temporary ID: Four octet random device identifier that rotates to protect
device identity.
– Second: Represents the milliseconds within a minute. Expressed as an
integer value from zero to 60999. A leap second is represented as values
between 60000 and 60999. Values 61000 to 65534 are reserved. The value
65535 is used to signify an unavailable value.
– Latitude: The latitude of the object expressed in 1/10th integer microde-
grees.
– Longitude: The longitude of the object expressed in 1/10th integer mi-
crodegrees.
– Elevation: The position of the object above or below the reference ellipsoid
(WGS-84). The value has a resolution of 1 decimeter.
– Positional Accuracy: Used to model the accuracy of the position with
respect to each axis.
– Transmission State: Current state of the vehicle transmission. Data ele-
ment utilized is of type enum.
– Speed: Vehicle speed expressed in unsigned units of 0.02 meters per second.
If unavailable, 8191 is used.
– Heading: Current vehicle heading expressed in unsigned units of 0.0125
degrees from North such that a value of 28799 degrees represents 359.9875
degrees. When data is unavailable, the value 28800 will be used. When
stationary, the past heading value may be used.
– Steering Wheel Angle: The angle of the vehicle’s steering wheel expressed
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in signed values between -126 and 126 with each value represents LSB units
of 1.5 degrees. A negative value indicates a left turn and positive values
represent right turns.
– Acceleration: Set of values containing three orthogonal directions along
the longitude, latitude, vertical axis along with yaw.
– Brake System Status: Contains all information related to standard brake
and system control activity of the vehicle. Such controls as Traction Con-
trol System, Anti-Lock Brake System, Stability Control, etc.
– Vehicle Size: Contains the vehicle length and width. Values are represented
as centimeters and a value of zero will be utilized when unknown.
• BSM Data Contents Part 2
The information contained in this section is broken into three data structures.
This information is optional and only transmitted when necessary.
– Vehicle Safety Extensions: This data is used by V2V safety applications
to calculate event flags, path history, and path prediction.
– Special Vehicle Extensions: This structure refers to vehicles that are ex-
cluded from normal traffic due to intent or ability. Examples are police
vehicles, emergency responders, and alternatively, heavy trucks carrying
hazardous materials. These vehicles are identified by additional certifica-
tion permissions barring civilian usage of this field.
– Supplemental Vehicle Extensions: This structure is used for additional
V2V applications. It is a means to develop experimental message content.
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2.7 V2V Applications
The safety benefits of V2V are made possible through multiple applications [14].
Through the use of the OBUs and RSUs, VANETs are dynamically created, joined,
and exited by vehicles within a given area, and are used to exchange traffic related
information. This allows drivers to take proactive actions when alerts are received
for events such as high congestion, collisions, and similar events. Existing examples
of V2V applications include:
• Emergency Electronic Brake Lights (EEBL)
• Intersection Motion Assist (IMA)
• Blind Spot Warning / Lane Change Warning (BSW/LCW)
• Forward Collision Warning (FCW)
These V2V applications are enabled through the exchange of BSMs between ve-
hicles. Data such as speed, heading, acceleration, brake status, and steering wheel
angle, are processed and alerts are displayed to the driver when potential threats are
discovered. In the case of Intersection Motion Assist, an alert is issued when one of
two cars determine that there is a collision imminent. Once delivered, the drivers
retain responsibility to prevent the collision from occurring (slow down, swerve, etc.).
For these applications to be possible, both vehicles need to be equipped with V2V
equipment.
When these V2V applications are coupled together, high level management pro-
tocols are possible. One protocol, platooning, is where vehicles with similar routes
group together. This allows vehicles to maintain speed and heading for longer periods
of time. Platooning also incorporates physical sensors attached to each vehicle which
allows for each vehicle to monitor the distance of other vehicles in their immediate
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vicinity. These sensors, typically radar-based or light-based, have been installed on
production vehicles since the mid-1990s and are referred to as Adaptive Cruise Con-
trol (ACC). This allows vehicles to alter their speed based on vehicles traveling in
front of them - without input from the driver. V2V combined with ACC is known
as Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) and is what allows platooning to
function. The benefits of platooning allow for improved traffic throughput as vehicle
density increases (more vehicles can be packed closer together) without increasing
commute times. In addition, fuel consumption is improved as vehicles are able to
draft behind lead vehicles.
2.8 Security Exploits
The most important requirement of implementing V2V communications is se-
curity. Developers must consider each aspect of the security triad (Confidentiality,
Integrity, and Availability) to allow vehicles to communicate sensitive information
without fear of malicious activity. Poor security implementation of V2V can have a
direct impact on human life. This section will review three distinct security attack
vectors in V2V, the effects of each, and what methods researchers have proposed to
mitigate said vectors.
2.8.1 Sybil Attack.
A Sybil attack is a scenario where a malicious node replicates multiple fake nodes.
The fake nodes would be able to spoof messages to actual nodes over saturating the
network. If successful, the malicious node has the ability to control the network.
Sybil attacks were first described in peer-to-peer scenarios [15]. It is possible for this
attack to extend to VANETs.
In [16], the authors describe a solution where each RSU determines three pa-
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rameters for each unique beacon packet it receives from a vehicle and uses them to
determine legitimate users from false users. These parameters include Received Sig-
nal Strength, distance of vehicle to RSU, and the angle from vehicle to RSU. Over
time, this allows RSUs to accumulate data and determine if nodes are moving at the
same distance and vector suggesting the nodes are Sybil nodes and can be blacklisted.
According to their findings, this technique displays high levels of accuracy identifying
Sybil nodes with a low false positive rate. However, there are two distinct hurdles that
this technique generates. Firstly, relying on RSUs to compute these three parameters
for each vehicle in the VANET can become computationally expensive quickly. Pro-
cessing can be lessened by increasing the amount of RSUs but this is not a logistically
feasible solution. The second obstacle is the lack of RSUs in rural areas. Low density
population areas have few incentives for RSU placement. This creates dead zones
where Sybil attacks have a higher chance of succeeding. This drawback could be a
accepted risk considering there is little reward for malicious attackers to deploy such
attacks in rural areas.
2.8.2 Denial of Service / Jamming.
A Denial of Service (DoS) attack occurs when an attacker floods a network with
an abundance of useless messages at a rate faster than the users on the network
can possibly process. Jamming is similar to a DoS attack as the attacker creates
interference on the network which disrupts the transfer of legitimate messages from
sender to receiver. With respect to WAVE, DoS or jamming attacks can occur on the
CCH when safety critical WSMs are sent [17].
The effects of these kinds of attacks are fortunately hindered by the fact that loss
of V2V communication does not impede functional capability of the vehicle under
attack. The only effect is that a driver will not be able to send or receive safety
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messages from surrounding V2V-equipped vehicles and RSUs. The potential issue
arises is when vehicles are in a platoon [18]. Thus, in scenarios where V2V determines
vehicle movements jamming could potentially lead to a collision.
The mitigation of this attack is built into the security layer IEEE 1609.2 - the CRL.
The CRL contains revocation information pertaining to certificates that have been
deemed untrustworthy. In this case, if an attacker has been found committing a DoS
attack, their certificate identity is added to the CRL by the CA. The CA disseminates
the revised CRL to RSUs which then disseminate to each passing vehicle and those
vehicles disseminate to any vehicle that has not yet received the revised CRL from a
RSU. The drawback to this solution is in locations with low RSU density it can take
a large amount of time before a vehicle can receive a revised CRL [19].
2.9 Certificate Requirement
NHTSA has proposed the use of PKI digital signatures for BSM verification. This
process involves every message to be signed by the sending device along with a valid
certificate. The certificate is composed of the date range that depicts the validity of
the certificate, the public key corresponding to a private key, and the digital signature
from a certificate authority. When a device receives a BSM it looks at the certificate to
verify that the signature is from a valid CA, and if so, the contents of the message can
be trusted. The receiving device does this by comparing the signature to an already
stored signature from the same CA. If the device does not have the signature, the
device sends a request to the CA of the sending device. The creation and verification
of a signed BSM is listed below.
Signed BSM Creation
1. Compute the hash of the message content using SHA-256.
2. Generate a digital signature by inputting the hash contents by using ECDSA.
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Verifying Signed BSM
1. Generate the hash of the message contents using SHA-256.
2. Verify signature by using the hash, public key, and signature though ECDSA.
3. Verify the digital signature back to the root certificate.
4. Verify the pseudonym certificate is not on the CRL
These two processes are depicted below in Figure 7.
Figure 7. The creation and verification of a signed BSM [1]
PKI allows for trusted and verifiable messages to be sent over public networks.
In typical public networks, sending and receiving entities are mutually known and
verified. When organizations need to make private interactions they rely on pre-
existing agreements with the CAs . However, in VANETs, this process is increasingly
more complex as consumer location privacy is introduced. Vehicles are expected to
verify digital signatures without identifying the sender in order to retain privacy.
Any single entity that has the ability to record location history would decrease public
acceptance of V2V whether that entity be a CA, law enforcement, or malicious actors.
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In addition, the large number of users proposed is unparalleled to any equivalent
network. Thus, an entirely new system is required to define the security infrastructure
that applies to the needs of V2V communication. NHTSA has chosen the SCMS
framework as the leading candidate design [20].
2.9.1 Security Credential Management System.
In [20], SCMS is set apart from other PKI implementation by allowing for high
volume of users as well as a balance between security, privacy, and efficiency. In the
US, full capacity is assumed to be three hundred million vehicles. With nearly one
thousand certificates per vehicle per year the SCMS is expected to undertake issuing
and managing three hundred billion certificates. To preserve privacy, responsibilities
are distributed to multiple authorities to prevent any one entity to obtain complete
identifiable information of any vehicle yet still perform necessary security functions in
an efficient manner. The individual components of the SCMS are listed and described
below. These components are depicted in Figure 8 below.
• Root CA: Provides the self-signed root certificate that provides the basis of the
PKI implementation.
• Intermediate CA: Can be used as proxy root certificates.
• SCMS Manager: Overseas operation of entire SCMS, most notably setting the
principles for misbehavior and revocation requests.
• Certification Services: Specifies the certification process that determines which
devices are to receive digital certificates.
• CRL Store: Receives CRL from the CRL Generator. Its main purpose is to
maintain and share CRLs
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• Enrollment CA: Issues enrollment certificates which allow a device to request
pseudonym certificates.
• Device Configuration Manager: Provides authenticated information about SCMS
to devices
• Device: A OBU or RSU that transmits BSMs
• Linkage Authority: Generates linking values which are utilized inside certifi-
cates. The SCMS design specifies two linkage authorities which prevents linkage
operators linking certificates to a specific device
• Location Obscurer Proxy: Prevents location detection by masking source ad-
dresses. When reporting to the Misbehavior Authority, it shuffles the reports
to prevent the MA from determining routes.
• Misbehavior Authority: Processes misbehavior reports and, if necessary, adds
misbehaving devices’s certificates to the CRL. The MA contains three sub
entities which are: Internal Blacklist Manager which keeps information on com-
ponents of the SCMS that may be misbehaving, Global Detection which de-
termines which devices are misbehaving, and CRL Generator which issues the
CRL for distribution.
• Pseudonym CA: Issues the short-term certificates to devices.
• Registration Authority: Receives and transfers pseudonym requests to the Pseudonym
CA.
• Request Coordination: Checks that a device does not request multiple sets of
certificates for the same time period.
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Figure 8. SCMS Design Overview [21]
In order to preserve privacy, certain components of the SCMS are separated to
prevent any one entity from acquiring enough information to determine device iden-
tity. The pseudonym CA and registration authority must be two separate entities
otherwise a single entity would be able to identify which pseudonym certificates have
been issued to devices. In addition, the pseudonym CA and linking authorities must
be two separate entities as the pseudonym CA would be able to link pseudonym cer-
tificates from the global pool to a device since the linking authorities know the linkage
values that make a portion of the certificate and the pseudonym CA sees these values
at the time of certificate generation. There must be multiple linking authorities to
prevent a single authority to link certificates. The Location Obscurer Proxy is its own
entity otherwise components would be able to determine location of vehicles. The
SCMS Manager should independent as it sets policies and is not necessary for regu-
lar operation. If not, the SCMS Manager could obtain global knowledge potentially
leading to privacy loss. The Misbehavior Entity should be its own entity otherwise it
could bypass SCMS policies. Lastly, the root certificate should be independent and
25
ran by a trusted organization.
2.9.2 Vehicle Based Security System.
NHTSA has also investigated an alternative certificate management design to
that of the SCMS. Like stated above, a device in the SCMS communicates with the
pseudonym CA to request pseudonym certificates. Under the VBSS, a device assumes
the role of the pseudonym CA reducing the necessity of a pseudonym CA and all
entities associated with it. In the end, the pseudonym CA, registration authority,
linking authorities, and request coordination entities are all removed. The system
creates Group Managers that provide credentials for each device to become their own
authority.
In VBSS, a device is attached to a group and is given a unique secret signing key.
All keys within a group are established with a single group certificate. A device creates
its own pseudonym certificates by signing the public key with its group key and thus
devices are subordinate CAs and pseudonyms are generated when needed. Verification
is completed by using the group certificate to authenticate the pseudonym certificate,
and then the pseudonym certificate to verify safety messages. Message exchanges are
anonymous since the receiver only sees the group certificate and not a specific device’s
certificate. Groups are managed by RSUs and can update group membership validity
by updating the group certificate and providing it to those that need to stay within
the group. By using pseudonyms and separating distributed identifiers VBSS claims it
achieves an acceptable level of privacy. However, VBSS remains the alternative choice
as group-based certificate schemes are not as mature as other forms of cryptography.
Figure 9 below shows the VBSS component interaction. Table 1 below compares the
entity differences between the SCMS design and VBSS design [22].
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Figure 9. Vehicle Based Security Services Diagram [1]
Table 1. Comparison Of SCMS and VBSS Components
Common Components SCMS VBSS
Root CA Linkage Authority 1-2 Group Manager
Certificate Services Pseudonym CA –
Device Configuration Manager Registration Authority –
Location Obscurer Proxy Request Coordination –
Misbehavior Authority SCMS Manager –
Enrollment CA CRL Store –
Whether the SCMS, VBSS, or a variation of both is adopted the security man-
agement behind V2V communication will be elaborate and certainly unlike any other
established cryptographic system. Aside from the root CAs and intermediate CAs
almost every entity described within the SCMS is novel which will require inten-
sive testing and multiple iterations of proofs-of-concept. Certificate revocation is a
complex aspect for both schemes. CRLs within traditional unique pseudonyms (i.e.
SCMS) are hindered by list growth, revocation determination, and efficient look up
times [22]. In VBSS, a single misbehaving vehicle causes the revocation of an entire
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group certificate. Alternate certificates could alleviate this issue but this would also
increase complexity and size - aspects that VBSS strives to improve upon from SCMS.
The following section will discuss past research and mitigation of certificate linking.
2.10 Related Work
This section will give an overview of NHTSAs Notion for Proposed Rulemaking
which is an aggregation of V2V design components, timeline, and manufacturer com-
ments. In addition to this document, research conducted by MITRE on behalf of
NHTSA is presented in regards to pseudonym linking and proposed mitigations to
pseudonym linking. Lastly, the three data flows described within NHTSAs Privacy
Impact Assessment are discussed as well as comments from the academic community
on NHTSAs proposed rulemaking.
2.10.1 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
In early 2017, NHTSA released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). The
extensive document was the result of many years of research and development of the
V2V standard. The goal of this document was to propose a federal mandate for all
new light passenger vehicles to be equipped with V2V communication. The agency
firmly believes that by introducing V2V communication, vehicle crashes will be able
to be reduced therefore lessening loss of life and destruction of resources [1].
The NPRM states that V2V communication is superior to current “vehicle-resident”
crash prevention technology such as cameras and sensors. This is because V2V has
the capability to detect other V2V-capable vehicles around blind corners and through
other vehicles. Current vehicle-resident technology such as cameras and similar sen-
sors are limited by line-of-sight. V2V also increases path prediction of other vehicles
as information such as steering angle and brake status are transmitted within the
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BSM. This allows for drivers to more accurately perceive the intended actions of
other drivers - especially useful within intersections. V2V communication is capa-
ble of transmitting three hundred meters, almost double the range of many vehicle-
resident sensors allowing for potential hazards to be detected farther in advance than
sensor-based alerts. V2V communication is not subject to the elements where sensors
can be affected by rain, light, and dirt.
However, NHTSA points out that V2V communication is not a replacement for
current sensor-based driver alert systems. On the contrary, V2V would complement
sensors-based alerts as they can detect non-V2V equipped objects in direct vicinity
of the vehicle. For example, lane and road departure warnings in addition to wildlife
that may dart across the road at a moments notice. V2V communication and vehicle-
resident sensors will be able to act as a checks and balances system where one system
will verify the findings of the other system. For example, in the event of a Sybil attack,
a vehicle would be able to utilize sensors to validate incoming V2V messages. While
these capabilities are relatively short term, NHTSA believes long term capability of
the mesh of these two technologies will further the development of automated vehicles
even to the point of true fully autonomous vehicles.
Despite the benefits listed above they do not come about without hurdles. For
V2V communication to become widespread, three major stakeholding parties must
be persuaded that it is beneficial to vehicle safety. These three parties are: the leg-
islative bodies, the automobile industry, and consumers. For consumers to adopt
V2V communication they must, among other things, trust that the technology will
not unduly infringe on their privacy. This hurdle is particularly difficult in today’s
political climate where hacking is widespread and prevalent. Legislators also need
to be persuaded that V2V is beneficial to the consumer and will not decrease pri-
vacy. Finally, another stakeholding party to consider is automobile manufacturers
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as they are the ones who must integrate V2V into their current platforms. This is
more easily done with the other stakeholders since manufactures are accustomed to
designing vehicles around several government mandates such as airbags, seat belts,
and similar safety requirements. V2V does not impose any physical limitations other
than OBU installation so it is fair to say that integration of V2V communication will
not significantly hinder manufacturer vehicle designs.
2.10.2 Proposed NHTSA Certificate Changing Method.
With NHTSA pushing for a mandate to require V2V on all new vehicles there are
several areas that remain dubious. One such research areas is the notion of changing
certificates. Using data learned from the Safety Pilot: Model Deployment program
NHTSA researchers developed a revolving certificate design where a vehicle utilizes a
single certificate out of a pool of twenty [23]. After five minutes the vehicle alternates
to another certificate from the pool. This process continues for a week when the pool
is discarded and a new pool is utilized. NHTSA believes that design allows for both
consumer privacy as well as efficient management of certificates.
2.10.3 Misbehavior Detection.
Proper misbehavior detection is critical for V2V devices to establish a foundation
of trust between one another. This is to include devices to self-diagnose themselves
(similar how vehicles have Check Engine Lights, etc.). Misbehavior detection provides
a method for V2V devices to identify “bad actors” and determine whether messages
from these individuals should be ignored or blocked. If an incident has been detected,
information from the transgressor will be accumulated by the reporting device and
transmitted to proper authorities. NHTSA believes that a misbehavior authority shall
be incorporated to review such reports for authenticity. If determined authentic, the
30
misbehavior authority will pass the misbehaving device’s certificate to the SCMS
who places it on the CRL. Without misbehavior detection in place, trust between
vehicles would degrade as misbehavior would go unchecked. In addition, misbehavior
reporting will need to be handled properly to prevent wrongdoers from obtaining a
simple attack vector.
However, NHTSA admits that additional research is required to better understand
data, processing, and algorithm development necessary to introduce a misbehavior
detection scheme into V2V communications. NHTSA has requested comments re-
garding misbehavior detection requirements, detection and identification techniques,
and identification capabilities over time. To do so with meaningful contributions,
misbehavior needs to be adequately defined such that identification techniques can
be developed and applied. For purposes of this work misbehavior will defined in the
following ways:
• Non-moving Misbehavior: Types of behavior that are included in this category
are misbehaviors that refer to a vehicle’s OBU, surrounding OBUs, and sur-
rounding RSUs. Any device that is not performing at specified BSM operating
requirements, either by malice or by malfunction shall be within this category.
These operating requirements are defined in SAE J2945. NHTSA proposes the
following types of misbehavior suspicion types:
– False Warning Report
– Proximity Plausibility
– Motion Validation
– Content and Message Verification
– Denial-of-Service Detection
• Moving Misbehavior: This category is refers to any V2V vehicle in motion that
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performs an act of misbehavior. It should be noted this does not refer to a mis-
behaving V2V device but rather the misbehavior of the vehicles and therefore
the drivers themselves. This definition goes beyond the notion of misbehavior
that NHTSA presents yet should be accounted for, as the possibility for V2V to
detect such misbehavior is present. This type of misbehavior can be described
in two categories: unethical and illegal. Unethical misbehavior describes vehi-
cles that do not follow established practices such as right-of-way rules, cutting
off other vehicles, and others. Illegal misbehavior describes not following estab-
lished traffic laws such as red-light running, hit-and-run collisions, and others.
2.10.4 Misbehavior Reporting.
After misbehavior has been detected, a report shall be generated with sufficient
information to determine if misbehavior has occurred. Due to the sensitive informa-
tion being stored persistently NHTSA has stated that any misbehavior reports must
be encrypted. NHTSA has suggested the following information to be included:
• Reporter’s pseudonym and certificate
• Time and Location
• Devices within range
• Speed
• Suspicion type(s)
2.10.5 Privacy Implications.
With the introduction of V2V communication, vehicle and driver privacy is at risk.
How does V2V - a system designed to disclose vehicle data - also prevent the disclosure
of data that impedes on consumer privacy? These two concepts inherently contradict
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each other. Public opinion is one of the biggest hurdles V2V has to overcome for
adoption and it is unlikely consumers would adopt technology that could potentially
create location tracking capabilities. NHTSA has spent considerable time and effort
on this topic. To address this issue, NHTSA released a Privacy Impact Assessment
that addresses these tracking concerns [3]. This document breaks down three flows
of data that hold potential for tracking to occur.
• BSM Broadcasting and Receiving - The first is the sending and receiving of
BSMs between vehicles. As discussed earlier, BSMs provide the fundamen-
tal functionality for V2V application such Forward Collision Warning (FCW),
Emergency Electronic Brake Light (EEBL), and Intersection Motion Assist
(IMA). The information that these messages contain may be harmless when
observed at discrete times and singularly, but aggregated over the course of
time may lead to identifying patterns compromising privacy. BSMs are not en-
crypted which opens up the possibility of third-party observers collecting these
messages; for good or malicious activities. V2V devices (OBUs, RSUs) are
not authorized to store BSMs for longer than what is necessary for safety or
malfunction purposes.
• Misbehavior Broadcasting and Receiving - When a V2V device receives a BSM
the contents are cross checked to validate the credibility. This may be done
using other vehicle-resident sensors or from other BSMs from neighboring de-
vices. Messages that do not pass this “fact check” are identified and a report is
generated by the reporting device and sent a subset of the SCMS. The SCMS
evaluates this misbehavior report and if the SCMS determines that the report is
valid it will add the certificate associated with erroneous messages to the CRL.
This blacklist tells all others V2V devices to use caution when receiving the
revoked certificate. Misbehavior reports include the reporting BSM, transgress-
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ing BSM, as well as any alerts that were issued by surrounding devices that
could support or refute the misbehavior that is suspected. With respect to pri-
vacy, misbehavior reports are retained for longer periods than typical BSMs and
include BSMs from neighboring vehicles that may not want their information
contained within the report.
• Certificate Revocation List Distribution - The last flow of data NHTSA dis-
cusses as a potential avenue for data leakage is the distribution of the CRL.
The security manager places certificate identifiers on the CRL that are appro-
priately deemed to be misbehaving. These identifiers are a time stamp, linking
seeds, and associated linking authorities. OBU would be able to compute the
certificates from these values.
In order to prevent data leakage from these avenues NHTSA, along with industry
partners, has pushed a “privacy by design” approach for the SCMS. Accounting
for privacy and security from the initial design allows for a more secure deliverable.
NHTSA released decrees that propose to increase privacy with respect to the three
data flows listed above. The primary control - directly identifying or “reasonably
linkable” data is not permitted to be exchanged - has received scrutiny from experts
within the security community [24]. The Center for Democracy and Technology
(CDT) states that data within BSMs are relatively simple to link and no mitigation
controls proposed by NHTSA are sufficient. Below are the aspects that the CDT
describes that lack privacy mitigation controls.
• Individual Linking - NHTSA has proposed the notion that BSMs shall transmit
location with accuracy up to 1.5 meters. The CDT states that this high of
accuracy would compromise specific vehicle location during times that would
be unnecessary such as in parking lots, driveways, and other low speed or non
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moving events. This could contribute to identification of vehicle ownership
and vehicle residence. They conclude by pointing out that this leads to driver
identification since shift workers, 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. workers, students, and
stay-at-home parents all have different identifiable driving patterns.
• Linking Certificate Changes - The CDT references the current certificate switch-
ing method by indicating five-minute lifetimes makes it simple to link BSM dur-
ing this interval. Additionally, even after certificate changes, linking BSMs with
two different certificates is only slightly more challenging. Using the contents of
the message, certificates could be linked. They give the example that a vehicle
traveling at 60 mph moves only 2.7 meters in between BSM which is lower than
the typical distance between successive vehicles allowing for BSM linking.
• Linking Message Content - The CDT points out that information in the mes-
sage can be linked to vehicle and therefore individuals. BSMs include vehicle
size within an accuracy of 0.2 meters. The CDT categorized 343 vehicles and
determined that the 0.2 meter accuracy resulted in thirty categories of vehi-
cles. Out of thirty categories, seven included only one vehicle and eight only
included two vehicles. The example is given that a F-250 and Ram 3500 share
a category with no other vehicle. Two BSMs sent with a reasonable amount of
time in between can be linked to a single vehicle with high confidence regardless
of certificate changeover. Vehicles with identical dimensions will differ through
other attributes such as speed, acceleration, steering angle, and yaw as these all
differ between make and model. This will allow for vehicle identification.
• Linking Certificates - The CDT states that the proposed certificate changing
method allows for an eavesdropper to listen to a vehicles certificates and gather
a significant portion of them just using a single location the vehicle frequents
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(e.g. driveway, workplace, etc.). They speculate that if a vehicle is driven for one
hour a day then eighty four certificate changeovers occur every week. An eaves-
dropper could, again, listen to these changeovers and link weekly changeovers.
• Associative Linking - If an eavesdropper is receiving BSMs from three vehicles
traveling along the same route with near identical speeds and it receives a cer-
tificate changeover then it deduces using the techniques above which certificates
to associate with respective BSMs.
• Transmission Range - NHTSA has stated that the minimum range for the range
of a BSM is three hundred meters but does not set maximum range or power
to limit the transmission radius. The CDT mentions that limiting transmission
range does not prohibit observers to use sophisticated antennas to listen in on
V2V broadcasts.
• V2V Tracking vs. Non-V2V Tracking - NHTSA compares V2V tracking to
other forms of vehicle tracking to point out that would be the path of least
resistance to a malicious actor. The non-V2V based tracking methods they
identify are physical surveillance, planting GPS device on a vehicle, physical
access to vehicle-resident GPS logs, electronic toll transactions, cell phone his-
tory, On-Star and similar devices, traffic cameras, and license plate transcribers.
The CDT points out that while these are all possible, but there is one critical
difference. V2V-based tracking allows for mass-surveillance while the non-V2V
tracking techniques are specific to a single vehicle. The example they give is a
malicious actor with one well-placed V2V receiver can monitor an entire neigh-
borhood with relative ease.
• Privacy Statement Inadequacy - NHTSA has proposed a privacy statement
that will be supplied with all V2V vehicles purchased. The CDT argues that
36
the statement in its current form is misleading to consumers. The statement
utilizes the verbiage “data that is not reasonably or, as a practical manner,
linkable to you”. This statement is intentionally left open to interpretation;
for better or worse. The privacy statement also includes how third parties are
allowed to listen to BSM traffic and only mentions the beneficial reasons for this
(e.g. accident avoidance, reduced congestion), but do not mention how third
party collection could be used for nefarious purposes.
2.10.6 Modeling and Simulation of Areas of Potential V2V Privacy
Risk.
In March 2016, MITRE released a technical memorandum entitled ”Modeling and
Simulation of Areas of Potential V2V Privacy Risk” [25]. The purpose of this work
was to study the privacy impacts by the broadcasts of BSM from OBUs and RSUs
from within a VANET environment. MITRE utilized the traffic modeling software
Simulation for Urban Mobility (SUMO) to generate datasets to fulfill this objective.
MITRE made the determination that the frequency of certificate changing and the
capability and capacity to collect BSMs is directly related the ability to track a
V2V device. Untargeted tracking and targeted tracking were both investigated for
this study. Untargeted tracking consisted of two geographical scenarios collecting
all BSMs possible. Targeted tracking consisted of choosing a single V2V vehicle.
The two principal variables MITRE uses in this study is RSU density and certificate
lifetime rate. RSU density was measured between 25% to 100% in 25% increments
(percentage indicates the amount of BSMs received by RSUs). Certificate lifetime
rates were varied between one and five minutes (in one minute increments).
In the two different geographical scenarios for untargeted tracking, MITRE deter-
mined that shorter certificate lifetimes coupled with lower RSU density reduced the
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possibility of tracking significantly. In addition to the primary variables, MITRE also
considered vehicle size and path history; two data points that are transmitted within
the BSM. In instances where a vehicle could not be matched to a previous certifi-
cate, MITRE was able to use path history or vehicle size to match vehicles. Targeted
tracking was divided into two categories - static RSU based tracking and mobile based
tracking. Both instances require prior identification. RSU-based targeted tracking
achevied comparable results to that of untargeted tracking. Mobile tracking was sim-
ulated by having a vehicle follow a victim vehicle and capture its BSMs as well as
any other BSMs that were received along the way. The trailing vehicle was able to
track the vehicle as long as the two vehicles remained within three hundred meters of
each other. If the separation exceeded three hundred meters, then the trailing vehicle
would only be able to restore positive identification if the separation dropped back
below three hundred meters before the vehicle’s certificate was rotated.
MITRE concluded that untargeted tracking is possible given the computational
resources to analyze the data. Due to the high computational overhead, large-scale
vehicle location tracking in real-time would be unlikely do to the level of difficulty.
However, when targeting a specific vehicle, real-time tracking is possible due to the
low overall computation needed. MITRE addresses the fact that successful V2V
tracking hinges on access to systems, ability to analyze accumulated data, and the
level of coordination necessary to aggregate BSMs.
2.10.7 Certificate Linking Mitigations.
Referring back to the SCMS and VBSS much of the design characteristics are
chosen to deter privacy leakage of individual devices from occurring. Perserving
consumer privacy is critical to public acceptance of V2V communication. This section
reviews three privacy preserving techniques specialized for the VANET environment.
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2.10.7.1 Silent Period.
In [26], the first mitigation discussed is the utilization of a silent transmission pe-
riod to thwart the linking of pseudonym certificates. A device will cease transmitting
messages at random times decreasing the chance of eavesdroppers linking sequential
transmissions. However, as pointed out in [27] this technique can be defeated by
Bayesian traffic analysis. This technique utilizes the messages sent before and after
the silent period to link messages. In addition, ceasing safety transmissions would
hinder the functional purpose of V2V and would be limited to short periods further
increasing odds of linking.
2.10.7.2 Group-Based Pseudonyms.
The second mitigation discussed in [26] is the use of spatial group-based pseudonyms.
Vehicles traveling in the same vicinity typically share redundant information (e.g.
heading, speed, traffic observations). Because of this, in many V2V applications,
every vehicle would not need to send information since many messages would be
identical or nearly identical. In addition, vehicles are restricted in a number of ways:
geographically by the roads they travel, velocity by speed limits, and direction due
to the nature of road lanes. It should be noted that edge cases exist that are the
exception to these observations. Vehicles could veer off the road, increase speed, and
change direction in short amounts of time.
After these observations are made, vehicles traveling together could form groups.
Since these vehicles are traveling together only one vehicle from the group would need
to send messages on behalf of the group. The other vehicles within the group could
remain silent during this time. This allows for a reduction in redundant information
being transmitted as well as a reduction in pseudonym certificates since vehicle travel-
ing silently would not need to rotate pseudonyms as frequently. However, the authors
39
observe that safety implication could arise through the use of the group pseudonyms.
2.10.7.3 RSU Coverage Restriction.
The last mitigation [26] discusses is limiting RSU placement. By establishing RSU
coverage gaps vehicle location tracking could be decreased. By doing so, overheard
and non-overheard regions are created. Overheard regions are when a vehicle can
be heard by an RSU and non-overheard regions are when a device can not be heard
by an RSU. The idea is for vehicles to rotate pseudonyms when in non-overheard
regions. However, this concept would be susceptible to the Bayesian analysis where
eavesdroppers would correlate the time a vehicle left an overheard zone with its speed
and the time a vehicle entered the next overheard zone. In addition, NHTSA per-
mits third-party listening meaning a third-party organization could install third-party
receivers with 100% coverage.
2.10.8 Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast.
Many of the same security concerns that plaque V2V communication carry over to
the aviation realm of Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast (ADSB). Similar
to what NHTSA is proposing for V2V, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
has mandated all aircraft to be equipped with ADSB Out by January 1, 2020 [28].
ADSB allows for aircraft to broadcast information such as position, speed, and other
data. By doing so, pilots would benefit from the safety alerts similar to that of V2V.
However, message interception and spoofing are threat avenues because encryption
and authentication mechanisms are not implemented [29]. The decision for this was
made based off the trade-off of safety and privacy. The FAA was determined that
safety was the utmost purpose of ADSB and the drawbacks from communicating
unencrypted and unauthenticated were accepted risks. After all, majority of individ-
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uals do not own personal aircraft and flight itinerary are already publicly available.
Switching lanes back to V2V, could this decision uphold in the larger environment of
VANETs?
2.11 Privacy Law
In [30], the author illustrates that privacy problems are hastily boiled-down to the
response of “That violates my privacy!” and often lack sound argument of why the
privacy problems are harmful. The lack of understanding of what privacy means and
how it will be protected results in headaches for policy makers as the definition of
privacy seems to transform from one scenario to the next. The author states that the
problem is that the term “privacy” blankets many things that, while related, cannot
be condensed into one single term.
In attempt to better define privacy this author depicts a taxonomy of four actions
that impede one’s privacy. These categories are further broken down into subcate-
gories. These subcategories will be discussed in a case-by-case basis with respect to
their relevance within the realm of V2V.
2.11.1 Privacy Law Taxonomy.
The following subcategories constitute the privacy law taxonomy.
• Information Collection
• Information Processing
• Information Dissemination
• Invasion
These four categories are sequential in order of how an entity would, if success-
ful, impede a person’s privacy. The first category is Information Collection. This
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category is divided into two subcategories: Surveillance and Interrogation. With re-
spect to V2V, surveillance will only be discussed as interrogation is not relevant to
the VANET concept. The author depicts surveillance as the watching, listening, and
recording of an individual’s activities. This directly correlates with the V2V third-
party collection of vehicles’ BSMs. The author gives the example of United States v.
Knotts where police installed a tracking device on the defendant’s vehicle. The Court
ruled that “amounted principally to the following of an automobile on public streets
and highways.” and stated that the Fourth Amendment did not apply because “[a]
person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.” However, this case
only considered the scenario of tracking a single vehicle. Third-party V2V message
collection would enable mass surveillance of every V2V vehicle.
The author defines Information Processing as the way collected information is uti-
lized by the collector. Information processing is further categorized into Aggregation,
Identification, Insecurity, Secondary Use, and Exclusion. In terms of V2V commu-
nication, aggregation would occur after collecting BSMs and associating the same
BSMs with the vehicle that transmitted them. Insecurity is the result of mishandling
of collected information. The V2V analogy for Insecurity would be if a third-party
organization allowed for release of collected BSMs through inadequate database pro-
tections. Secondary Use refers to the use of data for reasons unrelated to the initial
purpose of the data. V2V data collection or usage is not regulated therefore the num-
ber of use cases for V2V data is open-ended. It is hoped that this information will be
utilized for good such as traffic mobility and maintenance and not for nefarious rea-
sons such as tracking and stalking individual vehicles, and by extension, individuals
themselves. The last subcategory of Information Processing is Exclusion. The author
points out that among the Fair Information Practices there are three central prin-
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ciples: the existence of record keeping systems cannot be kept secret; an individual
must be able to determine how information is used and stored about them; and an
individual must be able to correct information about them. Failure to complete these
principles would be Exclusion. The author describes that Exclusion, like Insecurity
and Secondary Use, leads to feelings of powerlessness and vulnerability. In the event
of a V2V mandate, consumers would have no choice but to disclose information which
may lead to such feelings.
Information Dissemination is the broadest category as it covers the consequence
of openly available information - a topic that strikes the core purpose of V2V commu-
nication. The author breaks down Information Dissemination into seven categories:
Breach of Confidentiality, Disclosure, Exposure, Increased Accessibility, Blackmail,
Appropriation, and Distortion. The first - breach of confidentiality - relates to pub-
lic disclosure of information. With regards to unregulated third party collection the
“third party doctrine” could possibly apply for such situations. The doctrine states
that if information is possessed by third parties then the individual relinquishes a
certain expectation of privacy per the Fourth Amendment. The author states that
this is based on the secrecy paradigm - if secret information is known by two parties
then the information is not secret. The example for V2V would be the dissemination
of V2V information without permission or knowledge of the V2V users. Disclosure
is similar to breach of confidentiality, however, the difference is where the harm is
attributed. In breach of confidentiality the harm is dissolving of trust between two
entities. In Disclosure, the harm is to the individual that the disseminated informa-
tion was about. Simply put, disclosure is the allowing of information to spread outside
its reasonable boundaries. A simple V2V scenario would be a third party disclosing
locations of last known vehicle transmissions. Typically, these locations would be
living or working locations. If a malicious actor gained this information they could
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use it for nefarious purposes. Next, Exposure, would be release of information that
would embarrass or degrade an individual. Thus, is it included with disclosure.
Increased Accessibility refers to how readily available information is to outside
sources. The author depicts that with increased accessibility, the difference of quantity
becomes a difference in quality. The author relates this issue to aggregation as it
was recognized in United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press that researching through public record, archives, and other
decentralized forms of information is separate from a fully assembled dossier. Without
V2V, it is relatively simple to track an individual vehicle either by physically tailing or
installing a GPS tracker. However, mass surveillance with this technique of vehicles
is near impossible. Now, with the introduction of V2V, mass surveillance can be
obtained with V2V receivers. Third-party collectors only need to obtain V2V receivers
in order to gain access to V2V messages.
Blackmail, or extortion, is the use of dissemination of information as power over
an individual. In the case of V2V, the definitions for disclosure should suffice. Appro-
priation is the use of information to commercialize an aspect of an individual. This
subcategory does not fit within the realm of V2V and will be not discussed further.
Lastly, Distortion is damaging an individuals reputation typically through inaccu-
rate statements. With respect of V2V, an example could be if a third-party released
modified location records of an individual in attempt to tarnish that individuals rep-
utation. For individual’s seeking public office, such actions could prove detrimental
to their career.
The last category the taxonomy presents is Invasion. This category is separated
into two subcategories: intrusion and decisional interference. Firstly, Intrusion in-
volves invasions or incursions into one’s life. The author states ”It disturbs the
victims daily activities, alters his/her routines, destroys his/her solitude, and often
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makes his/her feel uncomfortable and uneasy“. Intrusion can be related back to
Information Collection as surveillance and interrogation can lead to feelings listed
previously. The harm of intrusion differs where feelings of paranoia - justified or not -
lead to changes in one’s daily activities. V2V surveillance could undoubtedly lead to
such beliefs and actions. Lastly, decisional interference refers to the unwanted incur-
sion by the government into an individual’s decisions about his/her personal life. In
relation to V2V, this is comparable to Intrusion such that its definition is sufficient.
In conclusion, privacy is a multi-faceted topic and necessitates multiple perspec-
tives to be adequately defined. Privacy has been debated within the judicial system
many times and the introduction of V2V will further complicate this issue. As the
Information Age continues to push forward so will the need to educate consumers on
how new technology may impede privacy. V2V communication is just one of many
that will further redefine privacy.
2.12 Chapter Summary
This chapter presented a technical summary of the V2V protocol and how it can
shape the future of vehicle safety through the use of particular V2V applications.
These include applications, such as blind spot warning and front collision warning,
that are currently available on vehicles through camera-based technologies. V2V
proposes to expand on these applications with examples such as Electronic Emer-
gency Brake Lights and Intersection Motion Assist. Each component of the BSM was
presented and discussed.
An overview of the research conducted by NHTSA was given, to include: V2V
privacy implications, misbehavior reports, and proposed certificate rotation methods.
Modeling and simulation of BSM linking was presented along with the conclusions
from that study. The next chapter of this document will utilize findings from that
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work and expand on the concept of BSM linking.
Finally, a non-technical privacy law taxonomy was presented to establish a degree
of understanding of privacy implications from a legal standpoint. The taxonomy
was divided into four categories. These categories help describe the multiple facets
of privacy to give a comprehensive viewpoint. Each category was related to V2V
scenarios such that an applicable relationship was illustrated.
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III. Design and Implementation Methodology
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the methodology utilized in creat-
ing a simulation capable for studying Basic Safety Message (BSM) linking. This
methodology addresses the pseudonym rotation in both candidate Public Key In-
frastructure (PKI) schemes, Security Credential Management System (SCMS) and
Vehicle Based Security System (VBSS). In addition, a method to create data am-
biguity is presented in order to lessen the accessibility of V2V tracking capabilities.
While no personally identifiable information is transmitted in BSMs, surveillance is
still possible when vehicle BSMs are aggregated together. This vehicle data – Ve-
hicular Identifiable Information (VII) – can be used to track vehicles throughout a
Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network (VANET) and thus an individual person. The National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) currently states that no directly
identifiable, or “linkable, as practical matter”, or “reasonably linkable” data will be
transferred. However, it was concluded BSMs could be reasonably linked given suf-
ficient resources [25]. This leaves a gap for research and development of methods to
deter BSM linking in order to preserve consumer privacy yet retain the safety benefits
of Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication.
3.2 Design Decisions and Constraints
When researching new technology, such as V2V communication, certain limita-
tions must be considered, especially when safety is considered. Since V2V is still
under development there are no official software releases of the IEEE 1609 WAVE
standard. There are limited ways to obtain the standard all of which suffer from sim-
ilar disadvantages. The following methods are research paths that were considered
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during the design process.
The first research path considered was to implement the standard from the ground
up using the IEEE 1609 standards. This method has the benefit of having complete
oversight over the design process, however, it is time intensive and typically more
difficult. This would leave little time for security evaluations of the standard.
The second is to obtain IEEE 1609 implementations from the academic commu-
nity. These have the benefit of being open-source and more notably free. However,
many of these implementations are incomplete and would need significant time and
resources to finish or are implemented using obsolete versions of the IEEE 1609 stan-
dard. Additionally, network simulation software packages incorporate portions of the
physical and MAC layers of the WAVE stack but omit the security and WSMP layers
(IEEE 1609.2 and IEEE 1609.3 respectively). Again, because of this, significant time
and resources would be required to implement the remaining WAVE stack layers.
The third method is to purchase prototype OBUs and RSUs from third-party ven-
dors. This has the benefit of being obtainable and working out-of-the-box. However,
the software running on these units are typically proprietary. Additionally, these units
are designed to be installed on vehicles which is difficult to replicate in a laboratory
setting.
The last method is to emulate a portion of the protocol in a simulation environ-
ment. This allows for the data being transmitted by vehicles traveling along roadways
to be emulated as well as the ability to measure parameters such as distance, speed,
and acceleration all within a laboratory environment. However, this approach is not
without its own limitations. Since the protocol is being emulated it is not an actual
implementation of the IEEE 1609 protocol. Due to this, it is crucial not fall in a cyclic
design scenario where a design flaw was mitigated but was not a flaw in the protocol
just the emulated portion. However, with this in mind, beneficial contributions are
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still possible and this design method was ultimately chosen for this research.
3.2.1 Experimental Design.
This methodology will be split into three experiments. Each experiment tests
certificate generation and the overall linkability between the BSMs of the candidate
PKI systems.
1. SCMS: In the SCMS, each vehicle makes a vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) re-
quest for pseudonym certificates when necessary. These pseudonyms are unique
to that vehicle and are temporary. NHTSA proposes the use of one pseudonym
for five minutes before rotating to another out of a pool of twenty total cer-
tificates. After one week, the pool is discarded and a new pool is used. Per
SAE J2735 this value is a 4 byte value allowing for 232 pseudonyms. In the
simulation, a group of twenty values are assigned within these windows.
2. VBSS: Under VBSS, every vehicle is part of a larger group. Vehicles use their
group certificate to sign outgoing BSMs. Vehicles receiving BSM only identify
the group the vehicle is a member of and not the individual vehicle. Pseudonym
values are 4 byte integers and shared between other vehicles.
3. VBSS with Dithering (VBSS-D): This PKI scheme utilizes the same system as
VBSS but also incorporates the data ambiguity method of dithering to non-
safety critical information such as vehicle size and message ID number.
This data ambiguity method presented in this document will be dithering. The act of
dithering is defined as “to act nervously or indecisively” and “add white noise” [31].
In this sense, dithering information creates indecisiveness within would-be attackers.
The goal of each subsequent PKI scheme is to decrease the quantity of identifying
vehicle information between itself and that of the previous scheme.
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3.2.2 Assumptions.
The following assumptions are consistent across each scenario.
• V2V-capable vehicles: All vehicles simulated are V2V-equipped. Each vehicle
transmits BSMs at the specified interval of 10 Hz.
• Road Side Unit (RSU) / Third-Party Receiver Access: It is assumed the RSU
is a third-party receiver that is placed near a road whose only task is to collect
BSMs. Third-party collectors have access to 100% of received messages.
• Basic Safety Message Requirements: The BSM is created and as specified by
SAE J2735.
3.2.3 Simulation Environment.
The simulation is written within the Python programming language. To create
a discrete event-based environment the library SimPy is utilized [32]. This allows
for simulations to be conducted faster than “wall clock” time. Events are sorted by
priority, simulation time, and lastly event identification number. For simplicity, only
one event is utilized for this scenario. This event is triggered when the first vehicle
in a list of vehicles enters the receiving range of the RSU. The purpose of using the
SimPy python library allows for quick successive simulation iterations.
3.2.4 Simulation of BSM Transmission Session.
Vehicles simulated driving along a linear roadway. This is done by increasing the
latitude BSM component of every vehicle by the distance a vehicle travels at its given
speed in 100 ms (the duration between BSMs). As the vehicles travel they update
every dataset with the BSM accordingly. Every vehicle’s pseudonym is forced to
rotate during transmission for testing purposes. Transmission of a BSM is emulated
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by inserting the BSM into a dictionary. After the default duration of 100 ms has
elapsed, each vehicle creates a new BSM, populates the data, and transmits it again.
The standard reception radius of an RSU is 300 meters thus a RSU can receive 600
meters worth of BSMs at a time assuming the RSU is directly in the middle of the
roadway.
3.3 Design Components
3.3.1 Response Variables.
• Disclosing BSM Data Elements: These are the amount of data elements within
the BSM that disclose usable information to an adversary. By changing the
PKI scheme each experiment, this allows us to analyze the effect these schemes
have on privacy.
3.3.2 Control Variables.
• Certificate Generation: Vehicles utilizes either unique certificates or group cer-
tificates.
• Vehicle Size: Each vehicle’s size is tested between static and dynamic. Dynamic
testing will incorporate a range from real-world vehicle sizes to not alert po-
tential eavesdroppers. This dynamic concept – defined as Dithering in Section
3.2.1 – is introduced to create data ambiguity between a vehicle’s BSM.
3.3.3 Constant Factors.
• Vehicle Path: Vehicles are simulated to travel along a linear roadway.
• Certificates: One pool of certificates are utilized. This total signifies one weeks
worth of certificates.
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• Simulation Duration: Each duration are held for the amount of simulation time
it takes each group of vehicles to enter RSU reception range and leave RSU
reception range.
• Vehicle Quantity: Five vehicles are utilized in each test.
• RSU Amount: Each experiment will utilize one RSU. The reception range is
300 meters. This range is the expected range for Vehicle-to-Anything (V2X)
devices.
• Vehicle Speed: Each vehicle maintains constant speed.
3.4 Generating the BSM
A Basic Safety Message class is constructed by following the definition and re-
quirements established by SAE J2735 [11]. Only data that is utilized for the first
part of the BSM is used. This data is the VII that will be used to link certificates to
vehicles. The contents of the BSM are shown below.
• Second: The time of transmission in simulation.
• Message Count: Integer between 0 and 172. Each vehicle is initialized with a
random message count.
• Temporary ID: The pseudonym certificate identifier.
• Vehicle Size: Size of the vehicle. Currently only transmits length for simplicity.
• Latitude: Latitude of vehicle. Initialized to zero and increments by accumu-
lating the distance the vehicle travels in 100 ms. This is dependent on vehicle
speed.
• Longitude: Longitude is constant yet unique for every vehicle.
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• Elevation: Based off WGS84 and is constant and identical for every vehicle.
• Heading: Each vehicle is traveling the same roadway thus the same heading.
• Speed: Each vehicle is traveling at constant and near identical speeds. They
are not identical as each vehicle will slightly differ from each other. They are
similar to prevent vehicles from occupying the same location space.
• Steering Wheel Angle: The steering wheel angle will be zero since the roadway
is assumed perfectly straight.
• Acceleration: Acceleration will be assumed near zero.
The data elements Brake Status, Transmission Status, and Positional Accuracy are
not utilized.
3.4.1 Vehicle Size Determination.
The vehicle data MITRE utilized is used for these experiments [25]. This data
shows that out of 308 make and model combinations, only twenty-five length to width
ratios exist. These ratios are described in twenty centimeter groupings. Data that
portrayed vehicle ownership composition was unavailable so data from a 2014 sales
analysis was utilized [25]. Only the top ten categories out the twenty-five will be
utilized as these represent almost 95% of total vehicles sold. During simulation one
vehicle will be attributed to each size category. The table below depicts all twenty-five
categories.
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Table 2. Top 25 Vehicle Length/Width Groupings Based on Sale (2014)
Length (cm) Width (cm) Sale Distribution
460 180 23.23%
480 180 19.80%
580 200 12.54%
440 180 10.74%
520 200 6.63%
480 200 6.00%
500 200 5.92%
500 180 4.85%
420 180 2.70%
560 200 2.18%
520 180 1.52%
400 180 1.31%
540 180 1.01%
360 160 0.44%
460 200 0.40%
380 180 0.19%
520 220 0.16%
600 200 0.16%
440 200 0.11%
380 160 0.10%
540 200 0.09%
620 200 0.09%
260 160 0.06%
500 220 0.02%
300 160 0.01%
3.5 Certificate Linking
3.5.1 SCMS.
Upon receipt of a BSM, if the temporary ID is unique the BSM is stored under
that unique ID in a dictionary. Otherwise, the BSM is stored over the last received
BSM of that temporary ID. Therefore, for every unique ID, only the initial and final
BSM is stored. After the simulation completes BSM matching is performed. Every
initial message and final message are compared against each other. The comparison
projects what each final BSM data would have been 100 ms in the future and compares
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it to that of the initial BSM. If the projected BSM matched the initial BSM then
it can be assumed the two BSMs originated from the same vehicle under two unique
pseudonyms - illustrating a pseudonym rotation.
3.5.2 VBSS.
Under the VBSS, pseudonyms are no longer unique and are now group IDs. Since
the pseudonym is no longer unique a new key has to be utilized for linking purposes.
Thus, a dictionary can no longer be used as there are no unique non-volatile infor-
mation being transmitted. Every BSM is now recorded the use of group pseudonym
and vehicle size filters are utilized. Again, if the projected BSM data matches any
of the initial BSMs then it can be assumed the two BSMs originated from the same
vehicle.
3.5.3 VBSS-D.
In the MITRE study [25], it was determined that quasi-identifiers such as vehicle
size and other data could be used to track vehicle certificates’ even when certificate
changing was implemented. It was shown that the longer the lifetime of a certificate
the higher the probability that tracking was possible. This work proposes a quasi-
identifier ambiguity method that dithers the value of these quasi-identifiers when
applicable. In doing so, this decreases the amount of quasi-identifiers eavesdroppers
can use as linking agents. It should be noted that, this ambiguity generation is only
be possible when V2V applications are not depending on the quasi-identifiers for
safety purposes. Otherwise, false information could be received by a V2V device and
recognized as legitimate. This could lead to unforeseen consequences such as collisions
and other detrimental effects.
Thus, the experiment uses the same certificate algorithm as VBSS but will incor-
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porate dithering on the non-safety BSM data components. The dithered components
are vehicle size and message ID. Vehicles are scheduled to randomly broadcast ve-
hicle size with a range of 270 - 520 (cm). This window range of the smallest and
longest length of current production vehicles in North America. Message ID will ran-
domly be chosen when the vehicle changes to a new pseudonym. Per SAE J2735,
non-sequential message IDs imply messages were lost in transmission, thus, randomly
changing message ID is not possible. Positional Accuracy is not dithered because fluc-
tuating the accuracy of the reporting vehicle would create unnecessary false-positive
and false-negative alerts. By introducing the notion of dithering, the usefulnesses
of BSM contents to a third-party collector is reduced increasing the level of effort
necessary for a collector to link pseudonyms.
3.6 Summary
The objective of this chapter is to demonstrate that using V2V BSM tracking
is accessible in a reasonably and practical manner. By building off the work of the
MITRE study and adding ambiguity generation this accessibility to V2V tracking
is reduced. The risk of location tracking may never be eliminated due to the con-
trasting nature of safety and privacy. However, the ability to decrease the feasibility
of third-party collectors to track vehicles is possible. This chapter discussed design
methods and constraints as well as test variables and factors to test dithering of BSM
attributes. Python and the SimPy simulation library was used to create the syn-
thetic environment utilized throughout this chapter. The following chapter analyzes
the effects of BSM linking between SCMS, VBSS, and VBSS-D.
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IV. Analysis
4.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate and analyze the Basic Safety Message
(BSM) eavesdropping simulation presented in Chapter III. This chapter is divided into
different section s that evaluates a different aspect of the proposed tracking deferral
algorithm. The first section explores the implications of Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V)
communication and will introduce topics that will be discussed throughout this chap-
ter. The second discusses the linking algorithm and its effectiveness to the three
different experiments from Chapter III. A Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network (VANET) eval-
uation metric is presented that illustrates the privacy, safety, and security trade-offs
that need to be considered when implementing V2V communication. This criteria is
applied to four different subsystems: a non-VANET environment, a Security Creden-
tial Management System (SCMS)-based environment, and a Vehicle Based Security
System (VBSS)-based environment, and lastly, VBSS with Dithering is discussed
along with VBSS as the core concepts are identical. In addition, the Common Vul-
nerability Scoring System is utilized to apply a quantitative metric to each Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI) scheme centered around location tracking. The final sec-
tion introduces policies and recommendations in order to thwart certain third-party
V2V tracking.
4.1.1 Adversaries.
Throughout this chapter, two types of adversaries are presented. The first, an
unsophisticated eavesdropper, is the equivalent of a burglar is considered. In theory,
this adversary places a single BSM receiver within a neighborhood. The transmission
range of a typical device is 300 meters; therefore, an adversary needs to be able
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to collect BSMs from each vehicle within the radius of the receiver. Vehicles begin
transmitting messages as soon as the vehicle is placed in gear resulting in vehicles
disclosing the latitude and longitude of the vehicles at each residence within the
neighborhood. In doing so, a link can be formed between individual vehicles and
residences. Over time, the actor can create a temporal pattern for each vehicle at
every household and use it to conduct numerous crimes. This act of eavesdropping is
referred to as unsophisticated because the linking occurs between data within a single
BSM and data that is non-BSM derived (in this case the latitude and longitude of a
house).
The second type of eavesdropper is that of the sophisticated eavesdropper. Unlike
the unsophisticated eavesdropper, this actor has the resources to place BSM receivers
across large distances; enough such that every BSM transmitted from every vehicle
would be collected. This actor also has the computational ability to analyze every
BSM collected and link BSMs that belong to the same vehicle. Thus, precise location
history can be determined for each and every vehicle. A study from 2009 shows that
using only work and home locations the identity of an individual could be revealed
[33]. The organized collection of BSMs not only reveal home and work locations but
also every location the vehicle visited including schools, doctor offices, and anywhere
in-between. A comprehensive pattern of life could result for every vehicle from this
data.
The motives for the sophisticated eavesdropper are more complex than that of
the unsophisticated eavesdropper. Actors that have resources and abilities to be
sophisticated would most likely be state-level organizations and large corporations.
Traffic laws such as speeding, red light running, and other moving violations could
be enforced through V2V communication alleviating some responsibility from law en-
forcement officers. This concept is similar to cameras that capture red light runners.
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One foreseeable circumstance for V2V monitoring is speed limit enforcement through-
out construction zones, school zones, and other specialized zones. Large corporations
could collect BSMs to determine where to locate businesses in high congestion areas
to maximize profits or sell the data collected to other corporations.
Note, the term Vehicular Identifiable Information (VII) and quasi-identifiers will
be used throughout this chapter. VII discloses information that can be tied to specific
vehicles. Where, unique pseudonyms are an example of VII. Quasi-identifiers are
BSM data that when aggregated together reveal vehicle identity. Vehicle size, message
count, time stamp, and location are forms of quasi-identifiers.
4.2 Implications of Dithering
In addition, this chapter analyzes the ability for advanced adversaries to track
individuals under the two PKI schemes presented by the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA) and VBSS with dithering. It is noted that dithering
is not possible when the dithered information is required for safety applications. One
such scenario is the notion of autonomous intersections where true vehicle size, speed,
and path history are required to be transmitted for at least the amount of time it takes
a vehicle to arrive, enter, and exit an intersection. Dithering vehicle information could
cause potential accidents or unnecessary congestion. A response to this scenario and
others like it would be to transmit information modified by a constant factor in order
to deter vehicle identification without crippling V2V effectiveness. For instance, in
autonomous intersections, vehicle’s should only be allowed to increase their reported
size by a certain factor and not decrease as this could lead to intersection overbooking
by the Intersection Manager (IM). Other information, such as speed, would not be
able to be dithered as speed is used by a IM to deliver reservations and thus true
speed is required to be transmitted.
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A second scenario where dithering would be not possible is high speed multi-lane
freeway scenarios especially during rush hour when freeways are highly congested.
During this scenario it is crucial for vehicles to maintain near constant speed to
prevent the “slinky effect” where vehicle spacing may compress or expand. With
dithering enabled, vehicles broadcasting fluctuating size, speed, and location would
inevitably cause events such as the “slinky effect” needlessly which in turn under
utilize the infrastructure and increase commute times which in turn frustrates drivers.
This would not benefit public opinion of V2V communication. In addition, rush hour
driving can include last minute lane changes, merging, and swerving from debris.
If a vehicle transmitted dithered size it could trigger false positives in surrounding
vehicles leading the driver to believe the V2V technology was misbehaving, therefore
decreasing the trust level of the driver. A response for these scenarios would be to
disable dithering at freeway speeds and at high capacity VANETs.
4.3 Linking Algorithm
4.3.1 Simulation Results.
Given the assumption of 100% of BSMs collection and the five vehicles utilized
across each of the three simulations results in the linking of each vehicle’s BSMs.
However, the differences in each simulation reside in the amount BSM parameters
at the disposal of third-party collectors to link BSMs as well as the level of effort
necessary for third-party collectors to create that link. The following sections depict
what data each simulation utilizes. For each simulation, a flowchart is given to depict
how BSM linking is achieved along with the relevant disclosing BSM data contents.
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4.3.2 Pseudonym Linking Algorithm.
The act of BSM linking is defined as connecting one or more BSMs to an indi-
vidual. This is done by using the spatial and temporal data elements within each
BSM. If successful, BSM eavesdroppers will be able determine vehicle owner identity
and complete location history of that individual. Dictionaries allow for entries (val-
ues) to be stored under unique items (keys) to increase efficiency. The dictionary is
populated in real time as the receiver receives BSMs from passing vehicles. If the
key is not in the dictionary a new entry is created using the pseudonym as the key
and the BSM is inserted as the value. If the key is in the dictionary the most recent
BSM in the values is overwritten unless that BSM is the initial message. Therefore,
only the first received BSM and last received BSM are stored for any one key. The
data within the first messages are compared to the final messages and any matches
are determined. The linking for each scheme is discussed in the next section along
with a flowchart to depict the linking process. All three of these algorithms result
in complete matching of BSMs due the spatial and temporal elements. However, the
level of effort and computational effort is increased between them.
4.3.3 Linking Effectiveness.
The SCMS scheme allows for multiple VII pieces to be tied to vehicles. The
pseudonym is the largest perpetrator since it is unique to a single vehicle. With
SCMS, the dictionary key will be each unique pseudonym. When two BSMs are
compared with two different pseudonyms (marking a potential pseudonym rotation)
the other elements of the BSM are compared to confirm or deny pseudonym rotation.
This is done by projecting the first BSM contents 100 ms in the future. Thus, if
the projected BSM contents and final BSM contents are alike, then a link between
pseudonyms can be formed. Once matches are identified the unique pseudonyms
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are now linked negating the purpose of rotating certificates. The unsophisticated
tracker does not have to perform BSM linking as their motives are to link vehicles
to specific locations (home, work, etc.). Thus, unique pseudonyms do not deter this
action. It also does not prevent sophisticated trackers from tracking through linking
unique pseudonyms by using BSM contents such as vehicle size, quasi-identifiers, and
vehicle location. Even rotating through certificates each week would only require the
sophisticated tracker to perform the linking process every week. The BSM contents
that are utilized in linking are unique pseudonym, vehicle size, and spatial/temporal
elements.
Figure 10. SCMS BSM Data Linking Flowchart
VBSS attempts to mitigate the linkability of unique pseudonyms by the use of
group pseudonyms. Since pseudonyms are common between vehicles the use of a
dictionary is no longer possible. This technique decreases the amount VII a vehicle
discloses but, in turn, transforms the pseudonym from VII as it was under SCMS to
a quasi-identifier. Thus, the unsophisticated tracker will still be able link locations
to specific vehicles. The sophisticated tracker will be able to utilize the vehicle size,
vehicle location, and other quasi-identifiers. This is shown in the linking algorithm
by filtering messages by group pseudonyms, then filtering by vehicle size. And lastly,
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location, movement, and timestamps are filtered creating individual patterns for each
vehicle. Group pseudonyms prevent vehicles from disclosing their individual iden-
tity yet aggregation of other quasi-identifiers will still lead to BSM linking and thus
location tracking. However, the VBSS scheme does increase the level of sophistica-
tion and effort required by eavesdroppers to successfully perform BSM linking. The
BSM contents that are utilized in linking are group pseudonym, vehicle size, and
spatial/temporal elements.
Figure 11. VBSS BSM Data Linking Flowchart
VBSS with Dithering utilizes the same VBSS implementation but attempts to
further decrease the amount of quasi-identifiers available for use in BSM linking. By
dithering the vehicle size in every BSM, VBSS with Dithering (VBSS-D) decreases the
usable quasi-identifiers to only vehicle location (depicted as latitude, longitude, and
elevation), the group pseudonym, and the time stamp. This is shown below in Figure
12 as a bypass around the Vehicle Size filter. Again, unsophisticated adversaries will
be able to link vehicles to specific locations. Sophisticated trackers will be able to
link BSMs through use of safety-critical information such as vehicle movement, time
stamps, and location yet by removing all non-safety usable VII and quasi-identifiers
has decreased the confidence of linking and forced the sophisticated tracker to pursue
more sophisticated tracking means. By doing so, VBSS-D prevents BSM linking from
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all except the most sophisticated adversaries. The BSM contents that are utilized in
linking are group pseudonym and spatial/temporal elements.
Figure 12. VBSS-D BSM Data Linking Flowchart
4.4 VANET Metric Classification Overview
A VANET metric classification will be presented to analyze and compare proposed
PKI schemes and depict how Dithering improves these methods. In addition, these
evaluation criteria is not to say which scheme is better or worse but rather to inform
consumers that inevitably have the decision of purchasing V2V-equipped vehicles in
the near future. The VANET metric classification broken into five subcategories:
Cost, Privacy, Safety, Efficiency, and Stability.
4.4.1 Scoring System.
The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) provides a means to classify
and quantify vulnerabilities of software and hardware [34]. By doing so, CVSS can
allow its users to properly analyze and manage their respective networks. CVSS is
an open framework allowing for transparency and ease of explanation for how each
and every measurement is produced. CVSS is categorized into three sections: Base,
Temporal, and Environmental. The base creates a fundamental score that is then
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modified by temporal or environmental elements, if applicable. For V2V purposes,
only the Base category will be utilized.
The Base category is split into two subsections: exploitability and impact metrics.
Each of these subsections are composed of separate components that are chosen based
on the network being analyzed. Both subsections and their components are listed
below.
Exploitability
• Attack Vector: Context by which the vulnerability is possible [Network, Adja-
cent, Local, and Physical]
• Attack Complexity: Conditions that must exist for the attack to occur [Low,
High]
• Privileges Required: Privileges the attacker must possess before execution [None,
Low, High]
• User Interaction: Requirement of a user, other than the attacker, must partici-
pate in order for successful execution [None, Required]
• Scope: The ability for a vulnerability in one component to impact resources
beyond its authorization [Unchanged, Changed]
Impact metrics
• Confidentiality Impact: Impact to the confidentiality of information [High, Low,
None]
• Integrity Impact: Integrity of information after a successful exploit [High, Low,
None]
• Availability Impact: Availability of a component after a successful exploit [High,
Low, None]
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4.4.1.1 Cost.
With any legislative mandate, cost is a critical item. V2V communication will
likely be initially deemed a luxury and therefore only available in high-end vehicles.
Any rule making determined partially by public acceptance and exorbitant prices will
hinder public support. In addition to consumer cost, this category also incorporates
costs that are indirectly paid for by the consumer such as back end infrastructure and
other necessary components.
4.4.1.2 Privacy.
V2V privacy, in this context, is the ability of third-party listeners to aggregate
information together and create a pattern of life for individual vehicles within a
VANET. NHTSA strives to push a “privacy by design” approach for V2V application
designers and the rule of no “reasonably linkable” data to be transmitted. However,
as described above, it is possible for eavesdroppers to use meta-data to create profiles
of individuals. This component is arguably the most important as data analytics is
an enormous field and many corporations are eager for V2V to become available –
regardless of the benefit to the consumer. Referring back to the privacy law taxonomy,
this topic will refer to information disclosure and processing.
4.4.1.3 Safety.
The main purpose to V2V is improve driver awareness with the objective of de-
creasing accidents. In many cases, however, the increase of safety typically leads to a
decrease of privacy. This has been accentuated in the past decade and half at airport
terminals. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, travelers have been subjected to more
invasive searches in the interest of increased safety. However, unlike airport termi-
nals, V2V will be integrated into consumers everyday lives. Consumers drive their
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vehicle daily where the average consumer may fly a few times a year so the trade-off
of privacy is reasonable for airport safety.
4.4.1.4 Efficiency.
In addition to safety, V2V also promises increased efficiency. By informing drivers
of congestion, V2V allows drivers to use alternate routes to their destination. This
decreases the amount of time the vehicle would be running decreasing the amount
of fuel consumed. In addition, traffic congestion is also reduced since more vehicles
would be taking alternate routes.
4.4.1.5 Stability.
The final component of this criteria is stability. This refers to the stability of the
VANET of how resilient it is in the event of malicious, misbehavior, and malfunction
events. In addition, ease of certificate revocation is considered within this category
as the mishandling of certificates during the revocation process may lead scenarios
where vehicles trusting revoked certificates.
4.4.2 VANET Metric Classification and CVSS Application.
These evaluation criteria are applied to three different subsystems. First, it is
utilized to describe non-V2V equipped vehicles to give a baseline for the other two
systems to be compared against. Secondly, the SCMS-based VANET where unique
pseudonyms are utilized is analyzed. The final section describes both VBSS and
VBSS-D as their PKI components are the same. To conclude each discussion, the
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) components are presented.
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4.4.2.1 Current Infrastructure (Non-V2V).
This evaluation covers aspects of VANET implementations and thus the current
cost to the consumer for V2V insignificant. Non-V2V privacy was discussed previ-
ously in Chapter II with the discussion of NHTSAs Privacy Impact Assessment. In
the assessment, NHTSA discusses current tracking vehicle techniques such as phys-
ically following a vehicle, installing a GPS tracker, and accessing cell phone history
and other databases. Out of the methods listed by NHTSA physically following a
vehicle is the most accessible method. This requires a ratio of one tracking vehicle for
every victim vehicle. However, these tracking techniques are only applicable when a
specific vehicle is the desired target. They do not account for mass systematic vehi-
cle tracking. Currently, this is probable through the use of individual mobile phone
applications such Google Maps or similar applications. In fact, Google currently uti-
lizes individuals’ mobile phone location data to display traffic congestion However,
the individual can opt out of this by turning location services off and individuals who
do not opt-out have to trust Google not to mishandle their data. In addition, the
Supreme Court case, United States vs Knotts [30], ruled that once one leaves his/her
home, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy. This case, however, occurred at
a time when connected vehicles were not a possibility.
Safety is a critical component of vehicle design and has been heavily influenced
by NHTSA studies and mandates in the past. Currently, many vehicle safety devices
are reactive in nature such as seat belts and airbags deploying safety mechanisms
milliseconds after a crash occurs. Recently, technology such as radar and LiDAR
has become more standard and has introduced active vehicle safety applications such
as lane keep assist, brake assist, and adaptive cruise control. So overall, vehicle
safety continues to improve as technology improves and becomes more standard across
vehicle lineups.
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Efficiency has also become a critical component of vehicle design as manufacturers
are subject to emission testing and more consumers in general strive to lessen their
environmental impact. Currently, emissions are reduced by designing more fuel effi-
cient vehicles such as utilizing hybrid engine designs, increased vehicle aerodynamics,
and routine vehicle maintenance (e.g. proper tire pressure, clean air filters, etc.).
Lastly, current vehicle network stability has become increasingly unbalanced as
recent vehicle technology has been susceptible to attacks [35]. However, many of these
attacks require sophisticated attackers and physical access to accomplish.
Table 3. Non-VANET Tracking CVSS Metric
Exploitabiltiy Classification Impact Metrics Classification
Attack Vector Physical Confidentiality High
Attack Complexity Low Integrity None
Privileges Required None Availability None
User Interaction Required Scope Unchanged
Scope Unchanged – –
The attack vector is classified as Physical such that the most prominent non-
V2V tracking methods (following, GPS-transmitter, etc.) require physical access to
the target vehicle. Attack complexity is low because non-V2V tracking methods are
relatively low effort. No privileges are required to perform these methods, and user
interaction is required as they need to be traveling in a vehicle to provide tracking
capabilities. Performing tracking methods does not affect scope in either category.
Confidentiality is classified as high since these methods reveal 100% location history
revealing other sensitive information. Availability and integrity remain unchanged.
The final CVSS score for non-VANET tracking is 4.3 (medium).
4.4.3 Security Credential Management System.
Under the proposed SCMS-based VANET, vehicles will have unique certificates
and the PKI implementation will utilize a split entity concept where no one entity
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will hold enough information to identify individual nodes within the VANET. Cost
will be broken down into two subcategories. The first will be the cost that will be
directly paid for by the consumer and the second will be the cost of installing and
operating the SCMS infrastructure. According to a 2014 study conducted by NHTSA
the total cost per vehicle in 2022 would be roughly $350 [36]. This cost is projected
to decrease to just above $200 over a thirty year time period. This cost can be further
broken down into four subcategories: equipment costs, fuel economy costs, security
credentials cost, and communication costs. The On-Board Unit (OBU) is reported
to cost the majority of the total cost coming in at around $330. By adding the OBU
to the vehicle, fuel costs are projected to $9 to $18 over the lifetime of the vehicle.
NHTSA projects a cost of $8.50 for securing communications across vehicles. How-
ever, they base this assumption on the belief of a low probability of misbehavior due
to a predicted low initial penetration rate of V2V. In the opinion of the author, this
mentality would reflect poorly on the adoption rate of V2V thus crippling the safety
purposes of V2V communication. Lastly, NHTSA estimates a fee of $3.14 attributed
for the cost of the SCMS. Based off these estimates, total annual cost is predicted
to be between $2.2 billion and $5.0 billion. NHTSA says that the “breakeven” point
(the point where the value safety benefits exceeds the costs to consumers and manu-
facturers) is between 2029 and 2032 depending on market penetration. At $2.2 billion
– $5.0 billion per year, convincing legislature that V2V communication would require
$22 billion – $50 billion investment before monetary benefits are realized would be an
extremely difficult hurdle. NHTSA also bases this analysis on human drivers where
it is exceedingly likely that autonomous vehicles will become standard. Waymo, Al-
phabet’s driverless car company, has recently deployed driverless vehicles in Phoenix,
Arizona [37].
Concerning privacy, NHTSA states that the SCMS design will make it difficult for
70
third-parties attempting to track vehicles and will need “requires significant resources
and effort to do so” [1]. As illustrated previously in this chapter, unique pseudonyms
provide a relatively simple way to perform BSM linking. In the author’s opinion,
NHTSA is underestimating the abilities and resources of third party organizations.
Home and work location pairs are sensitive information as it was demonstrated by
disclosing home location and work location a majority of Americans could be identified
[33]. V2V communication would not only disclose home and work locations but every
other location a vehicle has traveled allowing for a comprehensive pattern of life.
The current system does not prevent unsophisticated trackers such as burglars where
their goal is to determine when vehicles leave or exit, nor does it prevent sophisticated
trackers from creating profiles for each V2V equipped vehicle.
V2V communication introduces proactive safety monitoring applications discussed
in Chapter II. These are meant to alert the driver of potential hazards in effort to
prevent collisions from occurring. Proactive safety mechanisms have been introduced
in vehicles, such as Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR), but these devices are
limited by line-of-sight. V2V expands upon these systems by allowing numerous
additional safety applications, and possibly, in the not-so-distant future, autonomy.
In this sense, V2V and vehicle-resident systems can act as means to checks and
balances system where one systems verifies the other systems findings and vice versa.
V2V also promises the ability to increase efficiency. This is not done by improving
the efficiency of vehicles but rather the efficiency in how the vehicles are driven.
This can be done by a V2V alert informing the driver of congestion along his/her
predefined route. This would allow the driver to take a detour from the congested
route decreasing the amount time the driver would spend in traffic and reduce the
amount of traffic at the area of congestion. Emissions can also be reduced from the
notion of platooning. Platooning allows for multiple vehicles to travel together within
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close proximity to utilize the reduction of drag caused by the lead vehicle. However,
platooning requires near 100% adoption rate of V2V thus initial benefit is limited.
Lastly, the stability of the SCMS is uncertain. NHTSA states V2V will have a low
initial adoption rate such that there is little reward for malicious entities to act. This
is a favorable statement yet this outlook may prove to be naive. The proposed SCMS
is the most complex PKI implementations in terms of size, infrastructure entities,
and revocation requirements if created. The DoD PKI system is currently one of the
largest PKI systems in implementation with fifty million certificates [38]. Many of
which are long term such as the certificates used for Common Access Cards which
are utilized typically for three years [39]. SCMS will have to support certificates for
three hundred million vehicles – a conservative estimation. At twenty certificates per
vehicle per week the SCMS will have to support six billion certificates each week
assuming full V2V penetration. Supporting such a complex system is staggering even
without malicious activity. Introducing malicious actors and the task of preventing
security breaches while maintaining privacy of non-malicious drivers is overwhelm-
ing. In addition, certificate revocation is also an intense hurdle to overcome as well.
Under the SCMS scheme, vehicles create misbehavior reports and send them to the
misbehavior authority for analysis. The misbehavior authority analyzes them and
then determines whether to revoke or not revoke the misbehaving certificate. The
time for this process to occur will likely allow misbehaving vehicles to perform the
misbehavior action numerous times.
The attack vector now has changed to Adjacent as an adversary needs only a
V2V receiver to obtain BSMs and send them to a database for processing. Attack
complexity is two part; under unsophisticated adversary the attacker needs only one
V2V receiver to listen in on BSMs in order to gain information to complete his/her
goal thus complexity is low. However, a sophisticated adversary needs a network
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of V2V receivers to collect BSMs and then the software and hardware necessary
to perform pseudonym linking thus complexity is high. Again, privileges and user
interaction remain the same as non-V2V tracking. Confidentiality also remains high
as adversaries will be able to determine location history as well as vehicle size and
linking unique pseudonyms all which reveal sensitive information about the individual.
In addition, Availability and Integrity are classified as None as tracking does not affect
the integrity of BSMs and BSM are already readily available for collection. These
results are tablized below in Table 4. The CVSS score for SCMS tracking for the
unsophisticated adversary is 5.7 (medium) and 4.8 (medium) for the sophisticated
adversary.
Table 4. SCMS Tracking CVSS Metric
Exploitabiltiy Classification Impact Metrics Classification
Attack Vector Adjacent Confidentiality High
Attack Complexity Low* / High** Integrity None
Privileges Required None Availability None
User Interaction Required Scope Unchanged
Scope Unchanged – –
4.4.4 VBSS and VBSS with Dithering.
The evaluation will be applied to VBSS and VBSS with Dithering concurrently
since both are similar in nature. Where the differences reside will be illustrated. In
addition, the CVSS score will only be applied to VBSS with Dithering as this scheme
incorporates all aspects from VBSS alone. VBSS is not as mature as SCMS thus
not as much cost analysis has been meticulously done as is the case with SCMS.
However, much of the price can be inferred from VBSS requirements. OBU hardware
can be expected to be more expensive than hardware under the SCMS scheme as
VBSS incorporates cryptographic processes that are performed by the OBU. Apart
from OBUs, VBSS would require less internal entities than that of SCMS reducing
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operation. In addition, if a VBSS system was implemented, Road Side Unit (RSU)
interactions are reduced as vehicles pseudonym requests are less frequent than the
SCMS scheme. This sections applies to both VBSS and VBSS with Dithering.
VBSS reduces the amount of VII since pseudonyms are no longer tied to an indi-
vidual vehicle but are now tied to a group. However, vehicle size, speed, and location
are still broadcasted allowing linking. The use of group pseudonyms would disable un-
sophisticated trackers who lack the resources to aggregate BSMs. BSM linking using
vehicle size along with group pseudonyms time stamps enable sophisticated trackers
to form patterns of life for each vehicle through meta-data such as where a vehicle
travels throughout the day, time it spends at each location, and other techniques.
VBSS with Dithering strips all forms of non-safety critical VII but cannot remove
location transmission without crippling the safety applications of V2V. Thus, VBSS
with Dithering allows only highly sophisticated trackers the ability to track but still
allows tracking nonetheless. The evaluation criteria aspects of safety and efficiency
remain largely unchanged under VBSS than that of SCMS. Since PKI does not affect
the way safety applications and other applications operate the determination is fair.
Concerning stability, VBSS has less internal entities as than that of SCMS the
system is less complex however size is still a factor. Thus, many of the same conclu-
sions of SCMS apply to VBSS. However, revocation increases in complexity relative
to SCMS. In SCMS, if a certificate was determined to be misbehaving only that single
certificate needs to be added to the revocation list. In VBSS, if a vehicle is misbe-
having, the entire group pseudonym for which that vehicle belongs to would need to
be revoked. Some research has proposed implementing primary and secondary group
pseudonyms for cases such as this [22]. However, this also doubles the necessary
amount of certificate required to be maintained increasing complexity to an already
complex PKI system.
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Concerning VBSS all categories are identical to the SCMS CVSS analysis except
for Confidentiality. This metric has been downgraded to Low as non-safety essential
VII has now been deemed unusable through dithering and group pseudonyms. Thus
the CVSS score for unsophisticated and sophisticated adversaries 3.5 (Medium) and
2.6 (Low). VBSS and VBSS-D are listed under identical scores for Confidentiality
since there are only three options (None, Low, High). If the CVSS Confidentiality
category had finer granularity it would be able to represent each subsystem in greater
detail. These results are shown below in Table 5.
Table 5. VBSS with Dithering Tracking CVSS Metric
Exploitabiltiy Classification Impact Metrics Classification
Attack Vector Adjacent Confidentiality Low
Attack Complexity Low* / High** Integrity None
Privileges Required None Availability None
User Interaction Required Scope Unchanged
Scope Unchanged – –
The metrics for all three systems are shown in the table below. Based off these
scores, VBSS-D provides the best score (lower is better) in relation to information
disclosure to an adversary. It should be noted that the CVSS was not designed with
VANET in mind. In addition, CVSS should not be compared by score alone. The
context to which the score was determined should be taken into account before critical
decisions and design alterations are made.
Table 6. Scores of all VANET Schemes
System CVSS Metric
Non-VANET 4.6 (medium)
SCMS Unsophisticated: 5.7 (medium) & Sophisticated: 4.8 (medium)
VBSS with Dithering Unsophisticated: 3.5 (medium) & Sophisticated: 2.6 (Low)
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4.5 Policies
This section introduces policies and best practice methods for V2V communica-
tion in order to deter adversaries from utilizing V2V communication for malicious
purposes. The first policy presented is in attempt to prevent unsophisticated adver-
saries from determining home locations of individuals. Currently, NHTSA proposes
vehicles begin transmitting BSMs within two seconds after the driver places the vehi-
cle in gear (forward or reverse). In other words, NHTSA ”believes the vehicle should
begin transmitting before the vast majority of drivers begin driving the vehicle“.
However, with BSMs transmitting location within 1.5 meter accuracy eavesdroppers
will easily be able to determine driveways and parking spots of transmitting vehicles
which would lead to disclosure of owner identity. As stated earlier, such information
(e.g. work-home locations pairs) can and should be classified as personally identifiable
information [33].
If vehicles did not begin transmitting BSMs until a speed of 15 mph was reached
this would prevent vehicles from disclosing point of origin (e.g. home, work, etc.) to
a high degree of precision. It would allow vehicles to travel far enough away from
their start location such that exact residences were not revealed. However, this would
only prevent point of origin locations from being revealed and not destination.
To prevent disclosure of destination (i.e. home, work etc.) vehicles can be pro-
grammed with work and home locations (similar to how GPSs function) such that
when the vehicle enters a certain radius in relation to either location V2V transmis-
sions would cease. The safety aspects of halting transmissions should be properly
evaluated before being deployed.
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4.6 Summary
The goal of this chapter was to analyze the methodology presented to determine
the feasibility of BSM linking and ultimately the candidate PKI schemes NHTSA has
proposed for V2V communication. The notion of dithering non-safety critical BSM
data was analyzed to increase the sophistication necessary to link certificates. The use
of dithering VII such as vehicle size and the use of group pseudonyms eliminates the
usability of certain VII by eavesdroppers. However, highly sophisticated adversaries
can utilize safety-critical BSM data such as location, speed, acceleration, and even
steering wheel angle to determine vehicle location history. This history combined
with other forms of meta-data such as where vehicles travel and for how long can
allow these adversaries determine patterns of life revealing individual identity.
A VANET Metric Classification was presented that discussed the ramifications
focusing on five areas specifically cost, privacy, safety, efficiency, and stability. This
evaluation criteria was applied to each PKI scheme and highlighted strengths and
deficiencies within these five categories. In addition, the CVSS was applied to each
PKI to provide a quantitative metric for comparing these schemes. Lastly, polices and
best method practices were presented to mitigate the collection of vehicle departure
and destination locations.
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V. Conclusion
5.1 Introduction
As technology continues to advance, vehicle safety should advance along with it.
In the case of Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V), it is crucial for consumers to understand any
and all repercussions of new technology they purchase and entrust with their life.
5.2 Summary
This thesis introduced the Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE)
protocol which makes V2V communication possible. Safety applications were pre-
sented that highlighted how V2V could benefit drivers and possibly create a path
to fully autonomous vehicles. Current and past research was presented, mostly con-
ducted by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), that show-
cased the current state of the technology and introduced some concerns about vehicles
self-disclosing information. Most notably, the ability and consequences of eavesdrop-
pers linking two pseudonyms together through Basic Safety Message (BSM) contents
effectively revealing location history of every V2V-equipped vehicle.
Three Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) schemes were explored to show how eaves-
droppers could link two BSMs regardless of pseudonym. The purpose of each succes-
sive scenario is to decrease the amount of information available to the eavesdropper yet
retain V2V functionality. The first scenario was the Security Credential Management
System (SCMS) PKI, which is NHTSA’s current leading implementation. The scheme
utilizes unique pseudonyms for every vehicle which rotate every five minutes from a
pool of twenty certificates. Thus, to link two BSMs with dissimilar pseudonyms, an
eavesdropper could project the future location of the latter BSM by calculating the
location data and speed data of the first BSM. If the projected BSM matched the
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latter BSM then it could be determined that the two pseudonyms originated from
the two vehicles.
The second scheme was the Vehicle Based Security System (VBSS). This PKI
implementation utilizes group pseudonyms. Vehicles do not disclose individual iden-
tifiers but only the identity of the group of which the vehicle belongs. By doing so
the amount of information used for linking BSMs is decreased and thus increasing
the sophistication required by the eavesdropper. Linking is still possible through the
use of vehicle size, speed, and location parameters.
The third scenario utilizes the VBSS with Dithering (VBSS-D). This scenario uti-
lizes the group pseudonyms of VBSS along with the data ambiguity method of dither-
ing. This allowed the randomization of the non-safety critical information transmitted
from each vehicle. By implementing dithering the only information at the disposal of
the eavesdroppers is the safety critical information which are speed, time, and location
parameters. By doing so, dithering allows only highly sophisticated eavesdroppers to
link BSMs.
A Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network (VANET) metric classification was applied to these
three schemes as well as the current state of vehicle environments. The five categories
of the classification that were introduced were safety, privacy, efficiency, cost, and sta-
bility. These categories were chosen to evaluate the effects of V2V communication for
better or worse. In addition, the schemes were quantified using the Common Vulner-
ability Scoring System (CVSS) to establish scores to simplify comparisons between
schemes.
5.3 Contributions
The viability of maintaining location privacy while retaining safety applications
was presented throughout the course of this thesis. The fundamental information
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that is utilized by every V2V application (location, speed, and acceleration) are also
essential in linking BSMs. Thereby, absolute prevention of BSM linking was shown
to be not possible. However, through the use of group pseudonyms and data ambi-
guity methods, such as dithering, the technical sophistication required by third party
collects is increased. In doing so, consumer privacy loss risk mitigation is reduced
enough to fit within NHTSAs decree that no “reasonable linkable” data is permitted
to be transmitted.
5.4 Counterarguments
5.4.1 Privacy Is Already Forfeited.
The argument can be made that consumer information is already being obtained
through means other than V2V communication. This section will explore alternative
methods that enable location tracking and how they compare to V2V communica-
tion. The first method are RFID devices that are commonly utilized for toll passes.
Radio-frequency identification trackers can collect when and where vehicles travel es-
tablishing a pattern of life [40]. On a larger scale, Automated License Plate Readers
(ALPRs) record license plate numbers along with location, time, and date of scan-
ning. Attached to light posts, bridges, and police vehicles ALPRs have the ability
to create a pattern of life for every vehicle in their line of sight [41]. On an even
larger scale location history can be tracked through mobile device applications such
as Google Maps [42]. These applications can reveal high fidelity location history as
mobile phones are typically carried on a person at all times. However, these scenarios
all have mitigations that a consumer could execute to alleviate tracking capabilities.
RFID toll passes are not necessary to utilize toll roads, and while the trade-off is an
inconvenience to the driver; the driver has to make the conscious decision of opting-
in for device use. APLRs can be defeated through the use of photo-reflective license
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plate covers - aside from questioning legality. Mobile device applications, similar to
RFID toll passes, require the user make the conscious decision to opt in to disclosing
location information. Each of the scenarios involve tracking individual vehicles albeit
on differing scales. V2V communication would allow for comprehensive information
gathering on every vehicle that traveled within proximity of a receiver and there are
no preventative measures against it. Thus, in the opinion of the author, one should
not accept the notion that individual privacy is already forfeited.
5.4.2 Necessity of Message Authentication.
Whichever PKI design NHTSA pursues, it will become one of the most complex
and distributed PKI schemes in existence. In the case of SCMS, much of this com-
plexity is a result of the privacy by design approach. NHTSA claims through the
use of certificates recipients will be able to determine that a BSM originated from
a trustworthy source and thus the information contained within the BSM is factual
all while remaining anonymous. This notion counteracts the fundamental purpose of
authentication; the act of confirming data integrity by confirming a senders identity
[43],[44]. In a V2V environment, where messages determine vehicle paths, this can
result in costly and irreversible actions.
This thesis has discussed NHTSAs leading proposed PKI scheme SCMS and the
alternative of VBSS. The difficulties surrounding each scheme have been presented in
addition to the misapplication of the usage of PKI message authentication. Consid-
ering these issues together raises the question of the necessity of requiring message
authentication with V2V. From an individual vehicle point of view, the majority of
BSMs received can be ignored; (e.g. a transmission radius of three hundred meters
results in the reception of BSMs from many vehicles that do not pose a threat). With-
out message authentication, every BSM received must be trusted to contain factual
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information. In an ideal environment without malice this condition is acceptable.
Since malice must be accounted for, a mechanism must be implemented to recog-
nize counterfeit messages which is one of the major concerns in the safety-critical
environment of V2V.
Vehicle-resident devices such as LiDAR offer many similar applications that are
also available through V2V communication. V2V does not strive to replace this
technology as LiDAR allows for functionality unavailable from V2V such as lane
departure recognition and non-V2V equipped hazard alerts such as nearby wildlife.
These technologies used in conjunction can be utilized to cross verify one another.
When a vehicle receives a BSM which alerts the driver of a collision the vehicle-
resident devices can confirm the alert. Or, if the BSM was spoofed or modified in
transit the vehicle-resident devices can reject the V2V application alert and notify
the driver. Many consumer vehicles can be purchased today with vehicle-resident
technology thus by the time V2V is available most vehicles will have this technology
standard.
5.5 Future Work
This thesis focused on BSM linking between vehicles in SCMS, VBSS, and VBSS-D
PKI schemes. However, the scope of this thesis was limited. In simulation, only one
Road Side Unit (RSU) was utilized along with only five vehicles in effort to emphasize
the linking of pseudonyms before and after rotation. In future, more RSUs and more
vehicles could be added to show that complete patterns of life can be determined
regardless of simulation size. In addition, with the procurement of V2V and LiDAR
devices, the viability of cross-platform message verification can be analyzed.
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5.6 Conclusion
The benefits of V2V communication have the potential to greatly improve traffic
safety, congestion, and environmental conditions – likely greater than the inclusion of
any other vehicular safety mechanism. This thesis described how safety and privacy
are two opposing perspectives where totality in one meant degradation of the other.
The nefarious motives and resources of third party BSM collectors should not be un-
derestimated. The risk mitigation of BSM linking will never be completely reduced
as long as vehicles transmit precise location data. However, incorporating methods
such as dithering and group-based pseudonyms could increase the sophistication nec-
essary for eavesdroppers to perform BSM linking. Finally, this document questioned
the necessity of message authentication and proposed the use of technology such as
LiDAR in conjunction with V2V communication to verify message contents.
Data ambiguity methods – such as dithering – are one way to preserve consumer
privacy and retain the safety benefits that VANET technology provides. As more and
more vehicles are produced with Vehicle-to-Anything (V2X) communication more
sophisticated data ambiguity methods will be developed to protect consumers from
malicious actors.
It should also be stated that V2V deployment should not be delayed until every
issue is accounted for and mitigated. Rather, staggered deployments in fields where
privacy is of no concern would likely increase consumer adoption of V2V. For example,
ride-sharing, parcel delivery, and other similar delivery services could benefit from
V2V data analytics.
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